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ABSTRACT—Over the past twenty years, a growing number of empirical 
studies have provided evidence that governance arrangements protecting 
incumbents from removal promote managerial entrenchment, reducing firm 
value. As a result of these studies, “good” corporate governance is widely 
understood today as being about stronger shareholder rights. 
This Article rebuts this view, presenting new empirical evidence that 
challenges the results of prior studies and developing a novel theoretical 
account of what really matters in corporate governance. Employing a 
unique dataset that spans from 1978 to 2008, we document that protective 
arrangements that require shareholder approval—such as staggered boards 
and supermajority requirements to modify the charter—are associated with 
increased firm value. Conversely, protective arrangements that do not 
require shareholder approval—such as poison pills and golden 
parachutes—are associated with decreased firm value. This evidence 
suggests that limiting shareholder rights serves a constructive governance 
function as long as the limits are the result of mutual agreement between 
the board and shareholders. This function commits shareholders to preserve 
a board’s authority to exploit competitive private information and pursue 
long-term wealth maximization strategies. 
By documenting that committing shareholders to the longer term 
matters as much as, if not more than, reducing entrenchment for good 
corporate governance, our analysis sheds much needed light on the 
allocation of power between boards and shareholders, managerial 
accountability, and stakeholder interests. We conclude by outlining the 
implications of our analysis concerning the direction corporate governance 
policies ought to take. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Corporate governance matters. The complex framework of institutions 
and processes by which corporations are organized and managed1 affects 
 
1 Corporate governance comprises both external and internal mechanisms. The board of directors, 
shareholder rights, and compensation schemes are often described as primary examples of internal 
governance mechanisms. External governance, instead, refers to the role of market forces in 
constraining corporate behavior, including the capital, labor, and product markets. Existing studies, 
however, have largely focused on internal governance. See, e.g., JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 10 (2008). Although two of us have explained elsewhere why a thorough approach to 
corporate governance should not leave aside the interactions between internal and external mechanisms, 
see K.J. Martijn Cremers & Vinay B. Nair, Governance Mechanisms and Equity Prices, 60 J. FIN. 2859 
(2005) (investigating the value impact of the interactions between external and internal governance); 
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corporate performance and thus the aggregate welfare of society. This 
explains why the question of what draws the line between “good” (i.e., 
value-increasing) and “bad” (i.e., value-decreasing) corporate governance 
has long been central to corporate legal theory.2 Attempts to answer that 
question took a step forward in the 1980s, when empirical analysis to 
investigate governance models first became available.3 Discussions over 
the merits of such models no longer relied on theory only. Rather, 
empirical predictions about desirable governance arrangements could be 
tested against the actual data, through statistical analysis. Studies 
employing corporate governance indices, which first made their appearance 
in the late 1990s,4 proved especially useful. By benchmarking a firm’s 
governance quality against several governance provisions, governance 
indices provided a research design well suited to evaluate the various 
dimensions of a governance model.5 
The rise of corporate governance indices has made winners and losers 
in the corporate governance debate. Providing empirical evidence that 
incumbent protection from removal by shareholders—“entrenchment”—is 
detrimental to firm value, governance indices have offered strong support 
for a shareholder-centric governance model.6 Economically, the case for 
this model rests on the proposition that shareholders, as the corporation’s 
residual claimants, have the greatest incentives to provide value-enhancing 
governance inputs.7 As a corollary, so-called shareholder advocates view 
any restrictions on shareholder power as inefficiently insulating managers 
from shareholder discipline.8 Conversely, since the emergence of 
governance indices, advocates of the traditional board-centric model of the 
 
Simone M. Sepe, Regulating Risk and Governance in Banks: A Contractarian Perspective, 62 EMORY 
L.J. 327 (2012) (examining the implications of the causal relationship between external and internal 
governance mechanisms in the banking sector), in this Article we primarily focus on internal 
governance in order to facilitate comparative assessments with prior studies. 
2 See infra note 26. 
3 See infra text accompanying notes 63–64. 
4 See infra Section I.B.  
5 See infra Section I.B.  
6 See infra text accompanying notes 54–59. 
7 The standard economic reference for the basic assumptions underpinning the shareholder 
empowerment case is Michael Jensen and William Meckling’s agency theory of the corporation. See 
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs 
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
8 See Rafael La Porta et al., The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON. 
LITERATURE 285, 285 (2008) (describing the proposition that protection of outside investors limits the 
extent of their expropriation by insiders as “standard in corporate law”). 
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corporation—under which boards were protected from shareholder 
interference—have largely stood in the minority.9 
Further evidence of the influence of governance indices has been the 
rise and popularity of commercial governance indices, which are widely 
used by proxy advisory firms to provide voting recommendations to 
investors.10 Indeed, commercial indices not only share the same approach 
of academic indices,11 but also their unequivocal support for enhanced 
shareholder rights. 
This Article rebuts, empirically and theoretically, the currently 
dominant view that stronger shareholder rights are an all-purpose remedy 
in corporate governance. It does so by revisiting the evidence obtained in 
the empirical literature on governance indices—employing what is, to the 
best of our knowledge, the largest available dataset on corporate 
governance arrangements, covering thirty years of governance choices 
from 1978 to 2008—and developing a novel theoretical account of what 
really matters for firm value. 
In revisiting the existing empirical evidence, we focus on the 
entrenchment index or “E-Index.” Introduced in 2009 by a team of legal 
and financial experts,12 the E-Index provides evidence that six 
entrenchment provisions matter the most for firm value: staggered boards, 
poison pills, golden parachutes, supermajority requirements for charter 
amendments, supermajority requirements for bylaws amendments, and 
supermajority requirements for mergers.13 As of June 2016, over three 
hundred empirical studies have used the E-Index as a measure of 
governance quality,14 indicating that, as a matter of fact, the E-Index has 
become the standard reference to define entrenchment and, hence, “bad” 
governance. Yet, in estimating the association between the E-Index (and 
 
9 See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Origins: 
Adolf Berle and The Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99, 100, 145–46 (2008).  
10 See infra notes 92–95 and accompanying text. 
11 See infra note 92. 
12 See Lucian Bebchuk et al., What Matters in Corporate Governance?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 783, 
784–85 (2009).  
13 Id.; see also infra Section II.B.1 (discussing each of these governance arrangements in detail). 
14 Professor Bebchuk reports on his website that as of June 2016, at least 307 studies have used the 
E-Index that he and his coauthors developed. See Links to 307 Studies that Use the Entrenchment Index, 
HARV. L. SCH., http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/studies.shtml [https://perma.cc/87FM-
4LND]. Discussions of the E-Index have also frequently appeared in law reviews. See, e.g., Lucian A. 
Bebchuk, Essay, The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1637, 
1685–86 (2013); Sanjai Bhagat et al., The Promise and Peril of Corporate Governance Indices, 
108 COLUM. L. REV. 1803, 1821–23 (2008); Michael Klausner, Fact and Fiction in Corporate Law and 
Governance, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1325, 1363 n.155 (2013). 
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each of its six constituent components) and firm value, the creators of the 
E-Index only relied on a twelve-year period (1990–2002).15 Conversely, we 
rely on a much more comprehensive dataset over a much longer period, 
allowing for a more robust statistical analysis of the time-series association 
between corporate governance and firm value.16 
Our empirical findings call into question the indiscriminate approach 
to incumbent protection from removal as adopted by the E-Index and other 
academic and commercial governance indices. In contrast to that 
approach’s assumption that any form of incumbent protection is 
detrimental to shareholders,17 we show that only protective arrangements 
that can be unilaterally adopted by directors (unilateral protection 
arrangements)—poison pills, golden parachutes, and supermajority 
requirements to amend the bylaws—are associated with decreased firm 
value and hence fit the entrenchment theory of incumbent protection. 
Conversely, protective arrangements that require shareholder approval 
(bilateral protection arrangements)—staggered boards, supermajority 
requirements to amend the charter and to approve mergers—are associated 
with increased firm value. This finding suggests that these arrangements 
serve a constructive, rather than detrimental governance function. 
That function, we argue, is mitigating what we refer to as the 
shareholders’ limited commitment problem,18 which arises out of market 
imperfections—in the first instance, the possibility that market prices may 
fail to fully capture the implications of directorial decisions in the short-
term.19 Faced with this informational inefficiency and vested with strong 
exit rights, shareholders—all public shareholders, as a matter of course—
are unable to credibly commit to long-term value creation. That is, they 
have no basis on which to decide not to seek board removal or dump their 
shares upon a disappointing short-term outcome. This is because 
shareholders are unable to distinguish whether such an outcome is due to 
mismanagement or to the pursuit of a project whose value will not be 
realized until later. In response to this problem, to protect themselves, 
directors and managers rationally develop incentives to privilege short-term 
 
15 See Bebchuk et al., supra note 12, at 796. 
16 See infra text accompanying notes 129–30 (discussing the implications of using a time-series 
analysis in empirical research). 
17 See Bebchuk et al., supra note 12, at 788. 
18 See K.J. Martijn Cremers & Simone M. Sepe, The Shareholder Value of Empowered Boards, 
68 STAN. L. REV. 67, 73, 114–15 (2016). 
19 After the 2008 financial crisis, asset-pricing models that allow for the possibility of mispricing 
have been the subject of a large literature. See, e.g., Darrell Duffie, Presidential Address, Asset Price 
Dynamics with Slow-Moving Capital, 65 J. FIN. 1237 (2010) (providing a summary of these studies). 
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stock price gains over long-term cash flows. Similarly, shareholders’ 
inability to commit to the long term may distort the incentives of other firm 
stakeholders, including employees, customers, suppliers, and creditors. 
Indeed, these stakeholders may be induced to make suboptimal investments 
in a firm if the specificity of their investments make them vulnerable to 
short-term changes in investment policy. In either case, the result is 
reduced firm value in the long run. 
We find that bilateral protection arrangements help mitigate the above 
distortions by committing shareholders ex ante not to interfere with board 
decisionmaking in the near term, increasing longer-term shareholder and 
firm value. The adoption of a staggered board commits shareholders to 
longer directorial terms, making it more difficult for shareholders to renege 
on prior engagements vis-à-vis managers and stakeholders. Similarly, 
supermajority requirements to amend the charter and approve mergers add 
to a firm’s long-term commitment by introducing a bias in favor of 
institutional stability, making it more difficult to alter basic organizational 
rules unless both the board and a large majority of shareholders agree to the 
changes. 
This novel theoretical account suggests that promoting a firm’s 
commitment to the long term matters as much as—and potentially more 
than—reducing entrenchment in corporate governance. In order to 
empirically corroborate this conclusion, we divide the E-Index into two 
separate sub-indices: a “commitment index” (or, more briefly, “C-Index”), 
only including the E-Index’s three bilateral provisions, and an “incumbent 
index” (or, more briefly, “I-Index”), only including the E-Index’s three 
unilateral provisions. Consistent with our account of corporate governance, 
we document that increased scores on the C-Index (i.e., more commitment) 
are associated with increases in firm value. Conversely, increased scores on 
the I-Index (i.e., more entrenchment) are associated with decreases in firm 
value. As a further empirical test, we examine whether the use of bilateral 
protection arrangements is more valuable to firms where the shareholders’ 
limited commitment problem appears to be more severe, as predicted by 
our theory. To this end, we focus on three categories of firms: (1) firms 
with more long-term innovation; (2) firms for which stronger firm-specific 
investments by nonfinancial stakeholders, such as employees and 
customers, are likely to be more important; and (3) firms with more 
potential for excessive future risk taking to the detriment of financial 
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stakeholders such as creditors.20 In all three cases, we find empirical results 
that strongly support our commitment theory of bilateral protection 
arrangements. 
This Article’s analysis bears major implications for the debate on both 
the means and ends of corporate governance. Shareholder advocates have 
been very successful in portraying a shareholder-centric model as an 
efficient form of direct corporate democracy.21 They have been equally 
successful in representing the board-centric model as an inefficient form of 
corporate dictatorship, where incumbents can unilaterally and 
opportunistically protect themselves from removal at the expense of 
shareholders.22 This account of corporate governance, however, 
indiscriminately throws everything into one pot, failing to recognize the 
importance of the shareholders’ limited commitment problem. It also omits 
consideration that some protective arrangements are bilateral, i.e., premised 
on prior shareholder consent, which is consistent with the basic 
organizational principles of a republic rather than a dictatorship. 
Our analysis redresses both mistakes. First, we show that the goal of 
firm value maximization requires enhanced board protection in the short 
term without eliminating exposure to shareholder discipline in the longer 
term, shedding much needed light on the intertemporal dynamics of that 
goal. Increased protection from removal is necessary at the beginning of a 
director’s tenure, when directors are more likely to have competitive 
private information that the market lacks on the actions that contribute to 
longer-term value. That protection efficiently enables directors to take 
actions that “tolerate,” rather than “punish,” what may mistakenly appear to 
the market as “early failure” (e.g., low short-term earnings). Conversely, 
over time, as a director’s tenure matures and market prices are more likely 
to catch up with the director’s informational advantage, shareholders 
become better positioned to discipline directorial and managerial actions. 
Second, we show that the “republican board-centric model”—which 
empowers boards to resist short-term market pressure with the prior 
agreement of shareholders—better approximates the above organizational 
structure. Such a model adds value that direct shareholder democracy 
cannot provide by ensuring that shareholder discipline operates in the long 
term, rather than in the short term. Contrary to what shareholder advocates 
 
20 See infra text accompanying notes 227–31, 241–42 (discussing the proxies that we use to 
identify these specific features of corporate production). 
21 See infra text accompanying note 77.  
22 See infra text accompanying note 76.  
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frequently argue,23 a staggered board does not remove directors from the 
judgment of the market. Rather, it provides a time frame for directorial 
evaluation by the shareholders that is less likely to be biased by 
informational inefficiencies. Similarly, supermajority requirements to 
amend the charter and to approve mergers do not reduce long-term 
directorial accountability, but constructively strengthen board authority in 
the short term. 
Our analysis also bears noteworthy policy implications. For one thing, 
it suggests that the emphasis placed by providers of commercial 
governance indices on stronger shareholder rights may be pushing 
governance practices at many U.S. corporations in counterproductive 
directions. This is especially troubling if one considers that supporting 
stronger shareholder rights (and fewer incumbent protections) promotes 
increased shareholder activism, which, in turn, leads to more voting 
advisory activity and increased revenues for proxy advisors.24 In response, 
action by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)—requiring, as a 
first step, disclosure of the proprietary algorithms used in the construction 
of commercial indices—would be desirable to allow more transparency and 
discussion about the governance recommendations provided by proxy 
advisors. This, in turn, would help answer the question of whose interests 
those recommendations really serve. Similarly, the evidence produced in 
this Article challenges reform interventions that have increasingly 
sustained shareholder empowerment in the past two decades. Going 
forward, policymakers would do well to reconsider the case for limiting 
shareholder power in the short term and the direction governance policies 
ought to take to support long-term value creation. 25 
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides 
background on the history of the corporate governance debate, the rise of 
governance indices, and the present state of corporate governance research. 
Part II revisits the evidence for the association between the E-Index (and 
each of the six provisions it includes) and firm value, and, based on that 
evidence, develops a novel theoretical account of what really matters in 
corporate governance. Part III puts that account to further empirical testing, 
finding strong support for our claim that promoting shareholder 
commitment to the long term matters as much as, if not more than, 
reducing entrenchment for good corporate governance. Part IV discusses 
 
23 See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 14, at 1681 (“[H]aving a staggered board considerably enhances 
the extent to which directors are insulated from shareholder pressure . . . .”). 
24 See infra Section V.A. 
25 See infra Section V.B. 
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the implications that our analysis bears for the optimal allocation of power 
between boards and shareholders, managerial accountability, and 
stakeholder interests. Part V outlines desirable policy changes. 
I. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: WHERE DO WE STAND? 
The optimal allocation of power between boards and shareholders, the 
resolution of conflicts of interests among corporate constituencies, and the 
structuring of managerial incentives are widely recognized as essential 
corporate governance objectives.26 However, the principles that should 
guide corporate actors and lawmakers in structuring governance 
arrangements that efficiently pursue these objectives continue to be the 
subject of an intense debate. In this Part, we provide the background for 
understanding the importance and context of this debate, beginning with an 
overview of the main concepts that have historically informed corporate 
governance discussions. After that, we continue to trace the trajectory of 
those discussions by focusing on the rise of governance indices and their 
increasing influence over time in defining “good” corporate governance. 
We conclude this Part with an assessment of the present state of the 
corporate governance debate. 
A. Organizations, Markets, and American Corporate Law 
Although corporate governance theories tend to defy easy 
classification, a recurring distinction is between the corporation as a social 
organization—largely based on notions of entity, centralization, and 
authority—and the corporation as a creature of the market—largely based 
on notions of individualism, decentralization, and contract.27 
Until about the end of the nineteenth century, the corporate legal 
discourse took for granted that corporations owed their existence to a 
public concession by the state that chartered them.28 Emphasizing the 
state’s constitutive role, this view conceived of the corporation as an entity 
 
26 Scholarly contributions on these issues are too voluminous to be cited in full. For a 
nonexhaustive review of these and other prominent governance issues, see, for example, Lucian A. 
Bebchuk & Michael S. Weisbach, The State of Corporate Governance Research, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 
939 (2010). 
27 For a seminal attempt at capturing the different ideals that have historically characterized the 
corporate governance debate, see Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. 
L. REV. 923 (1984). 
28 See EDWIN MERRICK DODD, AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATIONS UNTIL 1860 WITH SPECIAL 
REFERENCE TO MASSACHUSETTS 14–15 (1954); William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of 
the Firm: Critical Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1484 (1989) (discussing the 
historical roots of the “special charter” phase of corporations). 
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transcending its individual participants and charged with the pursuit of 
public, rather than private, interests.29 The regulatory notion of early 
American corporate law was accordingly justified as a means to preserve 
the public purpose utility of the corporate form.30  
Things began to change at the turn of the century. With the rise of the 
large corporation characterized by the separation of ownership from 
control,31 and the ascent of individualism and economic laissez-faire 
attitude,32 corporations increasingly came to be seen as pursuing primarily 
private rather than public interests.33 As illustrated by the classic debate 
between Adolph Berle and Merrick Dodd in the 1930s,34 the shift to a 
private law approach to corporate relationships raised novel questions 
about the direction that developing corporate law rules ought to take. By 
analyzing the corporation through the lens of shareholders’ property rights, 
Berle naturally insisted on maximizing shareholder wealth as the 
appropriate corporate end and, in turn, on curbing managerial discretion as 
the means to reach that end.35 On the polar opposite side, Dodd remained 
true to the view of the corporation as a social organization, advocating a 
corporate model that granted directors and managers broad discretion in the 
pursuit of corporate interests36—including the interests of other 
stakeholders.37 
Although the corporate paradigm defended by Berle (both in his 
writings alone and with Gardiner Means) has exerted enduring influence on 
 
29 See Romano, supra note 27, at 931. The earliest corporations were generally chartered to 
undertake activities advancing the commonwealth—such as public utilities, transportation, banking, 
insurance, and water works—rather than corporate profitability. JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE 
LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1780–1970, at 17–
18 (1970). 
30 See David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 207–13 (discussing the 
extensive body of statutory and common law rules which early corporations were subject to). 
31 The classic reference is to the work of Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means, who first exposed the 
separation of ownership from control as the distinctive trait of the public modern corporation. ADOLF A. 
BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). 
32 See David Ciepley, Beyond Public and Private: Toward a Political Theory of the Corporation, 
107 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 139, 139–40 (2013). 
33 See id.; Millon, supra note 30, at 213. 
34 See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 9, at 122–35 (offering an exhaustive discussion of the Berle–
Dodd debate throughout its evolution over the years).  
35 See, e.g., BERLE & MEANS, supra note 31, at 84–89; ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., STUDIES IN THE LAW 
OF CORPORATE FINANCE (1928); A.A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. 
REV. 1049 (1931); A.A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. 
REV. 1365 (1932). 
36 See E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 
1145, 1147–48 (1932). 
37 See id. at 1154. 
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the modern corporate governance discourse, it is Dodd’s account that more 
closely captures the business model that long prevailed in corporate 
America.38 At the center of that business model was the “management 
corporation,”39 revolving around directors and executives who did not see 
themselves as shareholders’ trustees. Rather, they saw themselves as 
retaining virtually exclusive authority over the corporation, including 
authority to consider nonshareholder interests.40 
After a brief encounter with corporatism during the New Deal41—in 
which the idea of a public role of the corporation resurfaced under the form 
of a call for the social responsibility of managers42—the management 
corporation thrived on a unique corporate capitalism system. This system 
abandoned any element of economic progressivism,43 but continued to 
privilege a centralized decisionmaking paradigm: a governance model 
centered on “empowered boards,” largely protected from shareholder 
interference.44 Undergirding that model was a tacit social consensus that 
corporate growth took priority over corporate profits, as long as managers 
could compensate shareholders with stable dividends.45 In the prevailing 
 
38 Berle himself later came to concede that his debate with Dodd “ha[d] been settled (at least for the 
time being) squarely in favor of Professor Dodd’s contention.” ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., THE 20TH 
CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 169 (1954). Even before this concession to Dodd, Berle had 
adjusted his positions as events unfolded in his own time, embracing a view of corporate law that was 
closer to organicist ideals. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 9, at 120–21; Romano, supra note 27, at 
936. 
39 See Bratton, supra note 28, at 1473, 1482–94 (describing “the appearance, success, and 
endurance of the management corporation”). 
40 Lynn A. Stout, The Corporation as a Time Machine: Intergenerational Equity, Intergenerational 
Efficiency, and the Corporate Form, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 685, 711 (2015). For an exhaustive review 
of the political, sociological, and economic dimensions of managerialism, see WILLARD F. ENTEMAN, 
MANAGERIALISM: THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW IDEOLOGY 152–93 (1993). 
41 Corporatism emphasizes groups over individuals and cooperation over competition. A classic 
reference is Leo Panitch, The Development of Corporatism in Liberal Democracies, 10 COMP. POL. 
STUD. 61 (1977) (describing corporatism as an ideology that developed in the nineteenth century 
against the individualism and competition of the emerging capitalistic mode of production and which 
emphasized class harmony, organic unity, and mutual rights and obligations). For an exhaustive 
discussion of the influence played by corporativist ideals on the early phases of the New Deal, see 
DAVID CIEPLEY, LIBERALISM IN THE SHADOW OF TOTALITARIANISM 98–128 (2006). 
42 The idea was originally presented in a speech, New Individualism, delivered by President 
Roosevelt in 1932, but prepared by Berle and his wife, Beatrice. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 9, at 
110–11.  
43 According to political scientist David Ciepley, it was the impression left on the United States by 
the rise of totalitarianism—of which economic progressivism was seen as a dangerous antecedent—
which had a major role in directing this change of approach. CIEPLEY, supra note 41, at 1–9; see also 
David Ciepley, Authority in the Firm (and the Attempt to Theorize It Away), 16 CRITICAL REV. 81, 83–
84 (2004). 
44 See Cremers & Sepe, supra note 18, at 71, 123.  
45 Bratton, supra note 28, at 1492–93. 
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mindset of the time, only empowered boards could accomplish that goal, 
both because of their expertise (i.e., informational advantage) and their 
unique ability to resist the risk appetite of the “money makers”—bankers, 
brokers, and all sorts of speculators—who had played a major role in 
contributing to the Great Depression.46 
That mindset suddenly changed in the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
mainly due to sudden stagflation and abysmal stock market performance, 
both of which problematized the productive mode of the management 
corporation.47 Concurrently, the rise of the hostile takeover challenged 
boards’ empowered status, granting shareholders both the right to remove 
incumbents through the simple exercise of stock market purchasing power 
and a novel lever to influence investment policy.48 With perfect timing, it 
was then that the neoclassical theory of the firm made its appearance. 
Rejecting centralized decisionmaking as a distinctive trait of 
totalitarianism,49 neoclassicists viewed the firm as a web of contractual 
relationships among individuals, whose ongoing transactions were 
efficiently coordinated by the price mechanism.50 
Michael Jensen and William Meckling’s 1976 article, Theory of the 
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, is the 
landmark publication that formalized and directed the change of 
approach.51 Emphasizing the position of shareholders as the firm’s residual 
claimants, Jensen and Meckling reconceptualized shareholder wealth 
maximization as the best proxy for overall wealth maximization and 
identified managerial moral hazard as the primary inefficiency to be 
addressed by corporate governance.52 Viewed through this perspective, the 
market for corporate control was recast as the decentralized exercise of 
 
46 See id. (describing management discretion as an essential feature of the management 
corporation); Ciepley, supra note 43, at 105–07 (discussing the concerns caused by the “money 
makers” during the New Deal’s progressive era); Lynn A. Stout, Response, The Toxic Side Effects of 
Shareholder Primacy, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 2003, 2005 (2013) (describing the management corporation 
as immune to the logic of share price maximization). 
47 See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 9, at 144; Stout, supra note 46, at 2007–08. 
48 See Bratton, supra note 28, at 1520–21.  
49 See Ciepley, supra note 43, at 83–84.  
50 See, e.g., Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs and Economic 
Organization, in ECONOMIC FORCES AT WORK 73, 73–74 (Armen A. Alchian ed., 1977). 
51 See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 7. Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel are credited with 
having reinstated Jensen and Meckling for corporate legal theory. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & 
DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991). 
52 See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 7, at 305–08. 
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discrete contracting among shareholders that efficiently limited 
opportunistic managers from misusing valuable assets.53 
With the end of the hostile takeover era in the mid-1990s, the case for 
a decentralized decisionmaking paradigm of the corporation took the novel 
form of a claim for “shareholder empowerment,” which has since gained 
consensus.54 Shareholder empowerment first emerged as a response to the 
alleged impairment of the market’s operation due to the introduction of 
antitakeover statutes and the increased use by incumbents of antitakeover 
measures.55 Its original agenda mainly included proposals for facilitating 
managerial and board removal by shareholders,56 but it has progressively 
expanded to include proposals substantially shifting control of business 
policy from the board to shareholders.57 Underpinning this extensive reform 
program is the argument, built on neoclassical assumptions, that 
shareholders, as residual claimants, have the best incentives to provide 
value-maximizing governance inputs.58 Conversely, shareholder advocates 
argue, the incentives of directors and managers may deviate, driven by their 
private interest in compensation, private benefits, and job retention.59 
Board advocates—defending the received board-centric model of the 
corporation on the ground of directors’ informational advantage vis-à-vis 
 
53 See, e.g., Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 
110, 113 (1965) (pioneering theoretical assertions that the takeover phenomenon constituted efficient 
market control of the corporation). 
54 The leading voice among shareholder advocates is Harvard Law School Professor Lucian 
Bebchuk. See, e.g., LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE 
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 195–98 (2004) (arguing that shareholders 
should play a greater role in setting executive compensation); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case Against 
Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 973 (2002) (challenging board primacy in the 
takeover context); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 833, 851–75 (2005) (advocating for the expansion of shareholder governance rights); Lucian A. 
Bebchuk, Essay, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 694–711 (2007) 
(advocating for a reform of corporate elections to make directors more accountable to shareholders). 
For an exhaustive examination of the historical roots of the shareholder empowerment claim, see Dalia 
Tsuk Mitchell, Shareholders as Proxies: The Contours of Shareholder Democracy, 63 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1503 (2006). 
55 See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 
158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 671–72 (2010).  
56 See id. at 672–73 (including among the reform items of the original shareholder agenda: majority 
voting, the right to replace all incumbents every two or three years, the right to expanded access to the 
proxy statement, and the reimbursement of solicitation expenses).  
57 See id. at 673 (including among the items of the extended shareholder agenda: access to 
management’s proxy statements, the power to trump contrary board-adopted bylaws, and shareholder-
initiated charter amendments). 
58 See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Essay, The End of History for Corporate Law, 
89 GEO. L.J. 439, 449 (2001) (“[I]f the control rights granted to the firm’s equity-holders are exclusive 
and strong, they will have powerful incentives to maximize the value of the firm.”).  
59 See, e.g., Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, supra note 54, at 850. 
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dispersed shareholders60—have largely stood in the minority since the 
emergence of the shareholder empowerment claim.61 In fact, shareholder 
empowerment has become more a reality than an aspiration in recent years, 
mainly due to steady increases in shareholder concentration and activism, 
and the occurrence of legal changes that have rewarded the efforts of 
shareholder advocates.62 There is, however, one additional factor—largely 
underappreciated in the corporate law scholarship—which has played a 
significant role in advancing the shareholder empowerment case. As we 
explain below, that factor is the rise of empirical studies supporting the idea 
that stronger shareholder rights equate to better corporate governance. 
B. The Rise of Governance Indices 
Neoclassical theorists not only introduced new economic and financial 
concepts into the corporate governance debate, they also ushered in a 
revolution in methodology, incorporating empirical analysis into the study 
of corporate law.63 Jensen and Meckling’s postulate that maximizing 
shareholder value is the best means of maximizing firm value provided the 
theoretical underpinning for that revolution. On that postulate, it was now 
possible to test the efficiency of corporate law rules and corporate 
governance arrangements by estimating their impact on corporate 
performance as proxied by measures of shareholder value.64 
 
60 Although board advocates defend various theories of board authority, the informational 
advantage of boards emerges as a shared feature of these theories. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, 
Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 550, 559–
74 (2003) (exposing a theory of the corporation that combines board primacy and share value 
maximization); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 
85 VA. L. REV. 247, 250–55 (1999) (developing a theory of the corporation that embraces board 
authority, while rejecting shareholder wealth maximization); Bratton & Wachter, supra note 55, at 658–
61 (defending the traditional board-centric model of the corporation). Members of the Delaware 
judiciary also feature prominently among board advocates. See, e.g., Jack B. Jacobs, “Patient Capital”: 
Can Delaware Corporate Law Help Revive It?, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1645 (2011); Leo E. Strine, 
Jr., Response, Toward a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to Bebchuk’s Solution for 
Improving Corporate America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1759 (2006). Martin Lipton, a noted corporate 
lawyer, has also long been a leading defendant of board power. See, e.g., Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids 
in the Target’s Boardroom, 35 BUS. LAW. 101 (1979). 
61 See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 9, at 100, 145–46. 
62 See Cremers & Sepe, supra note 18, at 69–70, 135–36.  
63 See Roberta Romano, After the Revolution in Corporate Law, 55 J. LEGAL. EDUC. 342, 351 
(2005).  
64 See id. at 356 (noting that empirical work depends on shared goal specification and that the end 
of maximizing shareholder wealth provided that specification). But see infra Section II.A.2. (revisiting 
this view of the relationship between shareholder wealth maximization and efficiency analysis of 
corporate law).  
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Since the mid-1980s, the march of corporate law scholars into the 
realm of empirical research has steadily and inexorably increased,65 
producing innumerable empirical studies examining how individual 
governance arrangements relate to corporate performance.66 Arrangements 
and mechanisms that have been studied include, among others, board 
composition and size, shareholder activism, proxy fights, antitakeover 
defenses, and voting rights.67 These studies, however, have failed to 
identify a consistent relationship between governance and performance. A 
plausible explanation for this outcome—as observed by Sanjai Baghat, 
Brian Bolton, and Roberta Romano—is that “there are limitations with a 
research design that examines the effect on performance of only one 
dimension of a firm’s governance when governance mechanisms are 
numerous and interaction effects are quite probable.”68 
The limitations affecting studies of individual governance 
arrangements also help explain the popularity of governance indices. 
Unlike the previous studies, empirical studies employing governance 
indices investigate a firm’s governance quality by focusing on multiple 
governance provisions, which are assumed to be conducive to either 
desirable or undesirable outcomes. These multiple provisions are then 
combined into an index, in which, typically, a score is added for any of the 
selected provisions that is present in a given firm. This methodology thus 
effectively collapses the multiple dimensions of a firm’s governance into 
one number: the overall index’s score. 
For Baghat et al., this ability of governance indices to “quantify” a 
firm’s governance quality through one easily understandable measure is the 
indices’ key attribute.69 From a policy perspective, however, the indices’ 
primary advantage is to offer an empirical design that is well suited to test 
theoretical predictions about the efficiency of alternative governance 
models, which, by definition, involve a multiplicity of governance 
dimensions rather than just one dimension. Consistent with this view, the 
three governance indices that are widely regarded in the literature as the 
most influential—the “Antidirector Index,” the “G-Index,” and the “E-
Index”—all focus on governance elements that attempt to test the 
 
65 See Randall S. Thomas, The Increasing Role of Empirical Research in Corporate Law 
Scholarship, 92 GEO. L.J. 981, 982–83 (2004) (reviewing MARK ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINATES OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: POLITICAL CONTEXT, CORPORATE IMPACT (2003)).  
66 See Bhagat et al., supra note 14, at 1814.  
67 See id. at 1814–18 (providing a summary of these studies).  
68 Id. at 1818.  
69 See id.  
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efficiency of the two most popular models of governance: the traditional 
board-centric model and the increasingly popular shareholder-centric 
model. 
The Antidirector Index represented the first, seminal attempt at 
pursuing such an analysis of corporate governance. Introduced in 1998 by a 
team of financial economists—Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-
Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny70—this index focused on 
shareholder protection laws around the world,71 providing evidence that 
stronger shareholder protection is correlated with economic growth and 
market capitalization.72 
The G-Index, introduced in 2003 by another team of financial 
economists—Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii, and Andrew Metrick73—extended 
the analysis begun by the Antidirector Index, considering firm-level 
governance arrangements in addition to laws “on the books” and focusing 
on a sample of large public U.S. firms.74 Specifically, the G-Index is 
constructed as a composite of twenty-four “management power” (or “weak 
shareholder rights”) features.75 Higher index scores capture firms with a 
more board-centric governance model, which Gompers et al. call a 
“dictatorship” model.76 Lower index scores capture, instead, firms with a 
more shareholder-centric governance model, which Gompers et al. refer to 
as a “democratic” model.77 Like the Antidirector Index, use of the G-Index 
yielded results consistent with the theoretical assumption that stronger 
shareholder rights equate to better governance practices, showing that from 
1990 to 1999 firms with higher index scores (i.e., the “Democracy 
Portfolio”) had higher financial value than firms with lower index scores 
(i.e., the “Dictatorship Portfolio”).78 
The E-Index (or entrenchment index) is an index including a subset of 
G-Index provisions. Developed in 2009 by a team of Harvard professors—
 
70 See Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998).  
71 Specifically, the Antidirector Index focused on rules on “voting powers, ease of participation in 
corporate voting, and legal protection against expropriation by management.” Id. at 1115. 
72 See id. at 1116. The other notable result delivered by the Antidirector Index was that common 
law countries are more protective of investors than civil law countries. See id. For a review of the 
follow-up research as well as of the criticism engendered by Law and Finance, see La Porta et al., supra 
note 8.  
73 See Paul Gompers et al., Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q.J. ECON. 107 (2003).  
74 See id. at 109 & n.4.  
75 Id. at 109.  
76 Id.  
77 Id.  
78 Id. at 109–10.  
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Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Allen Ferrell (BCF)79—the E-Index was 
motivated to overcome the major methodological concern raised by the G-
Index: the inclusion of an excessive number of governance arrangements of 
unequal relevance.80 The E-Index only retained six of the twenty-four G-
Index provisions, which BCF hypothesized mattered the most for excessive 
management power, i.e., entrenchment.81 These provisions include 
staggered boards, poison pills, golden parachutes, supermajority 
requirements for mergers, supermajority requirements for charter 
amendments, and supermajority requirements for bylaws amendments.82 
Consistent with the hypothesis that reducing entrenchment is what matters 
the most in corporate governance, BCF found that the E-Index’s six 
governance provisions largely drove the negative empirical correlation of 
the G-Index with firm value.83 
Therefore, the evidence obtained for each of the above governance 
indices supports the view that stronger shareholder rights, and 
correspondingly lower entrenchment levels, are what draw the line between 
good and bad governance. The connection between this empirical finding 
and the case for empowering shareholders is clear and, as we shall discuss 
next, has exerted huge impact not just within academic circles, but among 
policymakers and real corporate actors as well. 
C. The End of History for Corporate Governance 
In theory, both a shareholder-centric model and a board-centric model 
have merits. The introduction of governance indices, however, enabled 
shareholder advocates to assert seemingly objective empirical evidence to 
defend the shareholder-centric model as superior: firms with empowered 
shareholders outperformed their peers with empowered boards. On this 
view, it is unsurprising that a few years after the introduction of the 
Antidirector Index, Reinier Kraakman and Henry Hansmann declared that 
“The End of History for Corporate Law” had arrived.84 The shareholder-
centric view of the corporation, they argued, had “earned its position as the 
 
79 See Bebchuk et al., supra note 12. 
80 Id. at 784 (“Some [G-Index] provisions might have little relevance, and some provisions might 
even be positively correlated with firm value. Among those provisions that are negatively correlated 
with firm value or stock returns, some might be more so than others.”). 
81 See id. at 788. 
82 Id. at 784–85; see also infra Section II.B.1 (providing a summary of the explanations offered by 
BCF to account for the specific institutional mechanisms that create entrenchment within each 
provision).  
83 See id. at 786. 
84 Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 58, at 439. 
110-4 CREMERS-MASCONALE-SEPE MASTER COPY II (CLEAN).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/24/2016 2:41 PM 
110:727 (2016) Commitment and Entrenchment in Corporate Governance 
745 
dominant model of the large corporation the hard way, by out-competing” 
alternative governance models, including the traditional board-centric 
model.85 As proved by the empirical findings obtained for the Antidirector 
Index—and even more so by the subsequent empirical findings obtained 
for the G-Index and E-Index—the market had provided a negative answer 
to the value of these alternative models, showing that enhanced board 
authority and managerial discretion inevitably resulted in “inefficiency of 
operations and excessive investment in low-value projects.”86 
The idea that good corporate governance is equivalent to stronger 
shareholder rights, while managerial entrenchment epitomizes bad 
governance, has won not just the academic debate. It has also gained 
predominance in the policy debate, both in the United States and 
internationally. At the national level, the enhancement of shareholder 
protection has figured prominently in both the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 
200287 and the Dodd–Frank Act of 2010.88 Likewise, at the international 
level, the influential Principles of Corporate Governance issued by the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) have 
traditionally placed strong emphasis on market forces and the alignment of 
manager and shareholder interests as primary disciplining devices.89 
Yet perhaps the most tangible sign of the support provided by 
governance indices for shareholder empowerment is the use to which they 
have been put by proxy advisory firms. These firms provide investors with 
voting recommendations on the election of directors, shareholder 
resolutions, merger proposals, and any other matter on which shareholders 
 
85 Id. at 468 (referring to the board-centric model as “the managerialist model”).  
86 Id. at 444.  
87 Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 745 (2002) (aiming “[t]o 
protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to 
the securities laws”). 
88 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, sec. 951, 
§ 14A(a)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 1899 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1 (2012)) 
(introducing say-on-pay shareholder votes and expanding the scope of shareholder proposals). For a 
discussion of other measures that have sustained shareholder empowerment at the regulatory level in 
the past two decades, see infra text accompanying notes 292–95. 
89 See OECD, OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 11–12 (2004), 
http://www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/31557724.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/F2AT-DLKD]. The OECD Principles are seen as best practices for multinational 
companies, rather than legal rules that could conflict with state or federal law. Id. at 4. The OECD, 
however, has recently enacted new Principles that seem to embrace a less shareholder-friendly view of 
corporate governance and, simultaneously, place more importance on both the coordination role played 
by the board of directors and the role of other firms’ stakeholders. See OECD, G20/OECD PRINCIPLES 
OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 13, 18–19 (2015), http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/
2615021e.pdf?expires=1456694506&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=2C7640420AE9C8C0EB055
AC31143882F [https://perma.cc/B9SZ-C76U]. 
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vote, playing a major role in influencing corporate governance policies at 
many U.S. corporations.90 Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), the 
largest proxy advisory firm, alone claims to advise over 1600 clients who 
manage over $25 trillion in assets.91 
In providing their services, ISS and other proxy advisors rely on 
commercial ratings that not only share the same approach of academic 
governance indices,92 but also their basic assumption that enhanced 
shareholder rights are consistent with best governance practices. Thus, 
whether the “[c]ompany is incorporated in [a] state without any state anti-
takeover provisions” and has a unitary board (or passed a proposal to 
declassify the board) figure prominently among the most important 
variables included in the ISS’s “Corporate Governance Quotient.”93 Even 
more noticeably, the “Board Accountability Index” used by Glass, Lewis & 
Company, the second largest proxy advisor,94 includes five of the six 
entrenchment components of the E-Index.95 
Further, while the studies employing academic governance indices 
have generally been cautious in avoiding any causality claim, proxy 
advisory firms exercise no such caution.96 ISS, for example, claims that its 
ratings can “identify the worst corporate offenders.”97 Anecdotal evidence 
also suggests that advisory ratings do change a firm’s governance practices, 
 
90 See Paul Rose, The Corporate Governance Industry, 32 J. CORP. L. 887, 898–906 (2007) 
(providing a description of the major players in the corporate governance industry). 
91 See Robert D. Hershey Jr., A Little Industry with a Lot of Sway on Proxy Votes, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
18, 2006, at B6 (describing proxy advisors generally as wielding extraordinary influence over corporate 
practices and identifying ISS as the most prominent advisory firm). 
92 Academic and commercial governance indices share the same methodology to the extent that 
they both collapse several governance dimensions into one single number: an overall index score. See 
Bhagat et al., supra note 14, at 1807. However, commercial governance indices also “differ 
distinctively . . . on several important dimensions.” Id. at 1824–25. For example, commercial indices 
vary the weights accorded to different governance provisions, rather than attributing the same weight to 
each provision as academic indices do. Id. at 1825; see also Robert M. Daines et al., Rating the Ratings: 
How Good Are Commercial Governance Ratings?, 98 J. FIN. ECON. 439, 441–42 (2010) (discussing 
methodological differences between academic and commercial indices). 
93 ISS, EXPLAINING THE CGQ METHODOLOGY CHANGE PROCESS 3 (2005), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20070413041233/http://www.issproxy.com/pdf/CGQevolvingmethodology
WP.pdf [https://perma.cc/RY9M-WG82]. Although the exact variables (and how they are weighted) are 
proprietary, ISS has disclosed the most important variables in the Corporate Governance Quotient. See 
id. ISS has subsequently replaced the Corporate Governance Quotient with Governance Risk Indicators 
(GRId) and then with the ISS Governance Quickscore (IGC). 
94 Glass Lewis, CTR. ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, http://www.execcomp.org/Issues/Issue/
proxy-advisory-firms/glass-lewis [https://perma.cc/H4A9-T985]. 
95 Bhagat et al., supra note 14, at 1822. Compared to the E-Index, the Board Accountability Index 
excludes supermajority requirements for charter amendments. See id. at 1822 n.65.  
96 See id. at 1806–07. 
97 Daines et al., supra note 92, at 439. 
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as boards have grown increasingly aware of the effect that a bad rating can 
have on their firm’s capacity to attract investors.98 It is thus unsurprising 
that Martin Lipton, noted corporate lawyer and outspoken defender of the 
received board-centric model of the corporation, blames “influential proxy 
advisory firms” as having played a major role in contributing to the 
increasing erosion of board authority in favor of enhanced shareholder 
rights.99 What is less frequently observed, though, is that the rise of 
academic governance indices has provided the intellectual support for the 
engagement of proxy advisory firms among shareholder advocates. 
D. The End of “The End of History”? 
For almost two decades, shareholder advocates have relied on the 
empirical literature on governance indices in their push for shareholder 
empowerment. They have been remarkably successful, holding the upper 
hand not just among academics, but also among policymakers and real 
corporate actors. “Corporate governance,” however, “is a moving target.”100 
As illustrated earlier, its history is studded with recurring turning points as 
changes in the marketplace or legal rules continuously bring about new 
practices and refocus scholarly attention on new matters of interest.101 After 
the 2008 financial crisis, we seem to have arrived at another one of these 
points. Indeed, while the regulatory response to the crisis has again 
involved an enhancement of shareholder power, corporate governance 
research has registered a major shift in interests, both theoretically and 
empirically. 
Recently the case for a board-centric governance model has received 
renewed interest due to the prominence gained by short-termism concerns 
during the recent financial crisis. These concerns arise out of the risk that 
“impatient” shareholders—those who are discounting future gains heavily 
due to short-term liquidity needs102—might prefer investments with high 
short-term results at the expense of long-term firm value.103 Challenging the 
 
98 In a recent survey, for example, public firm directors have listed corporate governance advisors 
as the third most influential institution on boards, behind only institutional investors and analysts. Id. at 
440. 
99 Martin Lipton, Some Thoughts for Boards of Directors in 2008, BRIEFLY, Jan. 2008, at 1, 1. 
100 William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Eclipse of the Shareholder Paradigm 47 (Jan. 
15, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Northwestern University Law Review). 
101 See supra Section I.A.  
102 See, e.g., Bratton & Wachter, supra note 100, at 16, 36. 
103 It appears that the first commentator to raise short-termism concerns was Martin Lipton. See 
William T. Allen & Leo E. Strine, Jr., When the Existing Economic Order Deserves a Champion: The 
Enduring Relevance of Martin Lipton’s Vision of the Corporate Law, 60 BUS. LAW. 1383, 1383–84 
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assumption that shareholders have the best incentives to provide value-
maximizing governance inputs, short-termism undermines the normative 
desirability of shareholder empowerment. The standard response by 
shareholder advocates is that short-termism depends on a market 
imperfection that has yet to be shown as real.104 Under the mainstream 
neoclassical assumption that current stock prices fully capture the present 
discounted value of a firm’s future income (i.e., the strong version of the 
Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis),105 short-termist incentives could be 
assumed to translate into a lower stock price today and, then, be competed 
away by efficient markets.106 Today, however, that argument is diluted of 
much of its strength. As shown by the near collapse of the U.S. financial 
system, “security mispricing, instead of being a temporary self-correcting 
problem, [is] . . . a problem that could and ha[s] spiraled out of control.”107 
Therefore, short-termism concerns are not merely theoretical; they are real 
and weaken the case for efficient shareholder control of the corporation. 
The argument that the rise of activist hedge funds and the steady 
increase in institutional shareholdings108 have added to the risk of short-
termism has also proved central to the new momentum of board 
advocates.109 On the one hand, most hedge funds are impatient investors in 
search of near- or intermediate-term value.110 On the other, money 
managers—who exercise much of shareholder power today—are also 
likely to support corporate policies designed to boost short-term earnings, 
 
(2005). In more recent times, short-termism concerns have come from academics, organizational 
leaders, business columnists, corporate lawyers, and business organizations. See Bebchuk, supra note 
14, at 1639–40 & nn.2–11 (quoting the most important contributions expressing short-termism 
concerns). 
104 See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Corporate Short-Termism—In the Boardroom and in the Courtroom, 
68 BUS. LAW. 977, 978–79 (2013). 
105 See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. 
FIN. 383, 383 (1970). 
106 See Roe, supra note 104, at 981–83.  
107 See Allen & Strine, supra note 103, at 1383–84 (quoting Michael Jensen). 
108 The phenomenon of ownership reconcentration has steadily grown since the 1990s, when 
scholars first began to take note of it. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 
89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 570 (1990) (documenting that the percentage of institutional ownership in New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) companies had increased from 45.2% in 1980 to 54.4% in 1988). 
Today’s institutional investors also seem more willing to take an active governance stance than they 
have been in the past, especially in cooperation with hedge funds. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey 
N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of 
Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 896 (2013). 
109 See, e.g., Martin Lipton, Important Questions About Activist Hedge Funds, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON 
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Mar. 9, 2013), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/03/09/
important-questions-about-activist-hedge-funds/ [http://perma.cc/VSA5-RAB9] (defending the view 
that hedge funds and other shareholder advocates “are preying on American corporations”). 
110 Bratton & Wachter, supra note 55, at 682. 
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as they thrive by increasing their portfolios’ current value.111 In spite of the 
attempt by shareholder advocates to downplay short-termism as a marginal 
problem, the current corporate scenario would thus make it much more 
likely that a substantial number of shareholders might have a short-term 
investment horizon.112 
Empirically, new studies have also appeared that examine the ill 
effects stemming from the combination of asset pricing inefficiency and 
short-term shareholder pressure. Theoretical models of rational managerial 
myopia—which were developed during the takeover era but so far lacked 
empirical confirmation—have provided the common starting point of these 
studies.113 Departing from the mainstream neoclassical account of the 
market for corporate control,114 myopia models suggested that an excessive 
focus on stock market results, combined with imperfectly informative 
market prices, could induce managers to privilege short-term stock price 
gains over long-term cash flows.115 As these concerns challenge the 
assumption that a firm’s antitakeover provisions are merely a product of 
managerial opportunism, such provisions have naturally represented a 
major focus of interest in the new empirical profile. In particular, a series of 
recent studies has challenged prior empirical results documenting a 
negative value impact of staggered boards116—one of the most widely used 
takeover defenses and a central component of both the G-Index and the E-
Index. In arguably the most comprehensive among these studies (the 
 
111 See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Essay, Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction 
to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 450–51 (2013) 
(describing a divergence of interest between money manager intermediaries with short-termist 
preferences and their beneficiaries, depicted as long-term investors). 
112 See Cremers & Sepe, supra note 18, at 116–17 (arguing that the rise of activist hedge funds and 
increased institutional shareholdings may increase the likelihood of Keynesian, i.e., speculative, prices).  
113 See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 100, at 56–58 (providing a brief summary of new myopia 
studies). 
114 See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
115 See, e.g., Adam Brandenburger & Ben Polak, When Managers Cover Their Posteriors: Making 
the Decisions the Market Wants to See, 27 RAND J. OF ECON. 523, 529 (1996) (arguing that managers 
may have incentives to take the decisions an uninformed market wants to see when they fear 
shareholder discipline); M.P. Narayanan, Managerial Incentives for Short-Term Results, 40 J. FIN. 
1469, 1470 (1985) (“By selecting a project that yields short-term profits, the manager can expect to 
improve the perception about her ability . . . .”); Jeremy C. Stein, Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient 
Firms: A Model of Myopic Corporate Behavior, 104 Q.J. ECON. 655, 667 (1989) (modeling suboptimal 
investments where managers maximize a weighted average of near-term stock prices and long-run 
value); Jeremy C. Stein, Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia, 96 J. POL. ECON. 61, 63–67 (1988) 
(showing formally that managers threatened by a takeover will sell underpriced assets).  
116 For a description of these studies, see Daniel M. Gallagher & Joseph A. Grundfest, Did 
Harvard Violate Federal Securities Law?: The Campaign Against Classified Boards of Directors 34–41 
(Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance, Working Paper No. 199, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2536586 [http://perma.cc/PDR2-DKC7]. 
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Cremers–Sepe study), two of us examined over thirty years of staggering 
and destaggering decisions, showing that as firms adopted a staggered 
board, their financial value increased, whereas firms that repealed a 
staggered board suffered subsequent drops in value.117 
Our explanation for the constructive governance role that staggered 
boards seem to serve—an explanation for which we find strong support in 
the data—is that they help mitigate what we refer to as the shareholders’ 
“limited commitment problem.”118 Faced with asset pricing inefficiency and 
vested with strong exit rights, shareholders are unable to credibly commit 
to long-term value creation. That is, they cannot commit not to seek board 
removal or dump their shares upon a disappointing short-term outcome, as 
they are unable to tell whether such an outcome is due to mismanagement 
or to the pursuit of a longer-term project. In response to this problem, 
directors and managers rationally develop myopic incentives. A related 
problem arises with the firm’s other stakeholders—employees, customers, 
suppliers, and creditors—as the value of their firm-specific investments 
might also be reduced by the shareholders’ ability to seek a short-term 
change in investment policy or rapidly sell their shares.119 In either case, the 
result is a decrease in firm value in the long run. Viewed through this lens, 
the adoption of a staggered board adds value by providing for longer 
directorial terms and thereby limiting the ability of shareholders to interfere 
with directors’ decisionmaking in the short term.120 
The new matters of interest taken up by governance scholars—asset 
pricing inefficiency, short-termism, myopic concerns, and the limited 
commitment problem—all point in the same direction: empowering 
shareholders may produce externalities that outweigh any potential 
benefits. The contrast with the evidence on governance indices and their 
basic proposition—that stronger shareholder rights are the essential 
 
117 Cremers & Sepe, supra note 18, at 101–04. For a broader discussion of the empirical aspects of 
our analysis, see K.J. Martijn Cremers et al., Staggered Boards and Firm Value, Revisited (May 2016) 
(unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2364165 
[http://perma.cc/7PH6-CVSH].  
118 See Cremers & Sepe, supra note 18, at 73, 114–15.  
119 See id. at 121–23.  
120 See id. at 74–75, 123; see also K.J. Martijn Cremers & Simone M. Sepe, The Financial Value of 
Corporate Law: Evidence from (Re)incorporations (Nov. 2015) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2519238 [http://perma.cc/2GHE-SQ37] (documenting that firm value increases 
following (re)incorporation in a state with more, or more severe, antitakeover statutes, especially for 
firms that are more likely to be affected by the limited commitment problem); William C. Johnson et 
al., The Bonding Hypothesis of Takeover Defenses: Evidence from IPO Firms, 117 J. FIN. ECON. 307 
(2015) (empirically documenting that in IPO firms, takeover defenses reduce the possibility that a 
change in control will harm the firm’s stakeholders, promoting more favorable contracting terms and 
increasing firm value). 
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component of good corporate governance—is apparent. However, in spite 
of the huge impact the indices have exerted, and continue to exert, on the 
real corporate governance debate, no revision of the value impact of the 
indices, and each of their components, has yet appeared in the literature. 
We hence turn to that task, revisiting the empirical evidence obtained 
for the E-Index as well as each of its six constituent provisions. Three main 
reasons motivate our choice of focusing on this index among those 
examined above. First, the Antidirector Index focuses on a cross-country 
analysis, rather than the internal governance arrangements of U.S. 
corporations,121 which represent our field of interest. Second, as compared 
to the G-Index, the E-Index presents fewer methodological concerns, as it 
considers a more restricted number of entrenchment provisions that 
allegedly fully drive the negative association with firm value.122 Third, as of 
June 2016, over three hundred empirical corporate governance studies have 
used the E-Index as a measure of governance quality.123 This suggests that 
the E-Index has largely become the standard reference in the literature to 
identify what matters for corporate governance and firm value. 
II. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REVISITED 
In this Part, as well as in Part III that follows, we empirically revisit 
the association between the E-Index (and each of the six provisions it 
includes) and firm value, expanding the original analysis that appeared in 
the study by Bebchuk et al. (BCF) (i.e., from 1990 to 2002) to a much 
larger data sample, which covers thirty years of corporate governance 
choices (i.e., from 1978 to 2008). In doing so, as explained below, we 
pursue a two-fold research objective, concerning both the means and ends 
of corporate governance. 
A. Research Objectives and Empirical Methodology 
1. The Means Axis.—Our primary purpose in revisiting the results 
obtained for the E-Index is to advance the ongoing debate on the means of 
corporate governance, offering novel evidence as to what matters for firm 
value and desirable governance models. The BCF study suggests that 
reducing managerial entrenchment is what matters the most, strengthening 
the case for a shareholder-centric governance model.124 That evidence, 
 
121 See supra text accompanying note 71.  
122 See supra text accompanying note 83.  
123 See supra note 14. 
124 See supra text accompanying notes 79–83.  
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however, stands in contrast with more recent empirical studies suggesting 
that empowering boards to resist shareholder and market pressures is 
beneficial to promote long-term value creation.125 There are three potential 
explanations for this conflicting evidence. The first potential explanation is 
that not all the provisions included in the E-Index matter equally for 
aggravating entrenchment, or that some may have offsetting benefits, such 
as mitigating the limited commitment problem. 
Relatedly, it might be that the E-Index is affected by either a 
“specification problem” or a “reverse causality problem.” Empiricists refer 
to a specification problem when changes in the dependent variable might 
be attributable to factors other than changes in the independent variable.126 
As applied to the E-Index’s analysis, this could then mean that changes in 
firm value might be attributable to differences in firm characteristics other 
than having adopted one of the index’s entrenchment provisions. A reverse 
causality problem is instead said to occur when the dependent variable 
causes changes in the independent variable, rather than the other way 
around.127 In other words, a relatively low firm value would induce firms to 
adopt such entrenchment provisions.  
In order to empirically verify the above hypotheses, we employ both a 
cross-sectional analysis and a time-series analysis of the association 
between the E-Index (and its components) and firm value. A cross-
sectional analysis compares how differences in firm value are associated 
with differences in the adoption of the E-Index provisions across different 
firms for any given year in a panel dataset.128 This kind of analysis can 
provide useful snapshots of the association between firm value and the E-
Index provisions over different years. However, it cannot capture temporal 
variations within the same firms and, therefore, is especially vulnerable to 
either specification or reverse causality problems. This explains why using 
a time-series analysis that employs firm fixed effects is regarded as a more 
reliable method of identifying empirical relationships in econometrics.129 
Unlike a cross-sectional analysis, a time-series analysis controls for any 
and all firm variables that do not change over time—that is, a firm’s “fixed 
 
125 See supra text accompanying notes 116–20.  
126 See, e.g., WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 56–58 (7th ed. 2012). 
127 See id. 
128 See JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICS: A MODERN APPROACH 846 
(5th ed. 2013).  
129 See, e.g., Jerry A. Hausman & William E. Taylor, Panel Data and Unobservable Individual 
Effects, 49 ECONOMETRICA 1377, 1377 (1981) (stating that using fixed effects represents a common 
unbiased method of controlling for omitted variables).  
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effects”—for each firm included in a panel dataset.130 In other words, this 
analysis adds a separate dummy variable for each unique firm, allowing the 
examination of what change in firm value within that firm occurred before 
or after a change in any of the E-Index components. Controlling for firm 
fixed effects thus significantly mitigates both specification and reverse 
causality problems. 
We emphasize that while BCF also employed firm fixed effects, they 
only rely on a twelve-year period (1990–2002).131 Conversely, we can rely 
on the availability of data over a considerably longer time period (1978–
2008) and arguably many more changes in the E-Index components.132 As 
significant time variation is essential to meaningful time-series analysis, 
our analysis should then be regarded as allowing a more robust statistical 
analysis of the time-series association between corporate governance and 
firm value.133 
2. The End Axis.—Our ability to trace the association between 
governance arrangements and firm value over thirty years also matters for 
the debate around the ends of corporate governance. In the standard 
account, Jensen and Meckling would have resolved the debate with the 
intuition that maximizing shareholder wealth is the best means toward 
 
130 JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF CROSS SECTION AND PANEL DATA 756 
(2d ed. 2010) (“The time series dimension . . . allows us to control for unobserved heterogeneity in the 
cross section units, and to estimate certain dynamic relationships.”). 
131 See Bebchuk et al., supra note 12, at 802 tbl.4.  
132 This seems especially important if one considers the transformations that have taken place in the 
corporate landscape both before and after the time period examined by BCF. As discussed earlier, the 
years from 1978 to 1989 correspond to the “takeover era.” See supra text accompanying notes 47–48. 
This era marked the beginning of the erosion of the traditional board-centric model by active 
institutional investors, which produced significant variation in the use of antitakeover defenses and 
other entrenchment provisions. See Martijn Cremers & Allen Ferrell, Thirty Years of Shareholder 
Rights and Firm Value, 69 J. FIN. 1167, 1167–69 (2014). The 2002–2008 period also witnessed a 
dramatic transformation of U.S. corporate governance. On the one hand, there was the introduction of 
substantial regulatory reforms, both at the federal and state levels, following Enron and the other 
corporate governance scandals of the early 2000s. See supra text accompanying notes 87–88. On the 
other hand, shareholder empowerment progressively became a reality in those years. See supra note 54 
and accompanying text.  
133 Our ability to investigate comparisons of the long-term value associations of governance 
choices also helps address more general criticisms that have been raised against the use of governance 
indices. These criticisms have mainly been directed at challenging the notion that a “one-size-fits-all” 
model of corporate governance might exist. See, e.g., Bhagat et al., supra note 14, at 1808; Rose, supra 
note 90, at 924–25. For these scholars, corporate governance “depends on context and on firms’ specific 
circumstances.” Bhagat et al., supra note 14, at 1808. Hence, governance arrangements that are good 
for one firm might be bad for another, and vice versa. Empirically, this argument translates into an 
endogeneity concern—more precisely, a specification problem—which our time-series analysis should 
help to mitigate.  
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maximizing overall wealth.134 As received by many corporate law scholars, 
especially in the 1990s and early 2000s, that intuition implied that 
maximizing shareholder wealth was the only end of corporate law. As a 
proof of that claim, these scholars argued that it was the empirical 
consensus on shareholder primacy that had enabled the use of empirical 
tools in corporate governance research, opening the door to employing 
shareholder value metrics as measures of corporate governance 
efficiency.135 
This account, however, fails to consider the intertemporal dynamics of 
the shareholder wealth maximization mandate, while also oversimplifying 
the relationship between that mandate and the use of shareholder value 
metrics in efficiency analysis. Without specifying what the process of 
creating shareholder wealth involves over time, such a process inevitably 
turns into a requirement to cater to today’s stock price. That requirement, 
however, ignores crucial intertemporal issues in the efficiency of market 
prices. Indeed, only under the assumption of perfectly informative prices 
can managing based on the current market price be assumed to serve the 
end of overall value maximization. Yet, as soon as we depart from the 
strong version of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, a hypothesis that 
the recent financial crisis has exposed as unrealistic, managing based on the 
current price promotes short-termism and other inefficiencies.136 Further, 
for similar negative results to arise, one need not assume that market prices 
are systematically uninformative.137 It is instead sufficient to assume that 
market prices are “discontinuous,” that is, unable of fully capturing the 
implications of directorial and managerial decisions until those 
implications begin to show up in cash flows over time.138 
In response to these intertemporal dynamics, corporate law scholars 
have increasingly emphasized the need to focus on long-term shareholder 
 
134 See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
135 See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
136 See supra text accompanying notes 102–07.  
137 Uninformative prices (or Keynesian prices), however, might cyclically occur, as two of us have 
explained in earlier work. See Cremers & Sepe, supra note 18, at 112–14. 
138 See Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective 
Function, 14 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8, 17 (2001). More technically, discontinuous prices are 
“nonmonotonic” in the sense that they do not follow a consistent informational pattern due to the 
information asymmetry problems existing between shareholders and managers. See Simone M. Sepe, 
Information and the Corporation (Feb. 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors). The 
economic mechanisms explaining such inconsistency hinges on Bayesian updating, which identifies the 
process through which rational investors update their beliefs about firm value. See Paul R. Milgrom, 
Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications, 12 BELL J. ECON. 380 (1981). 
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value as a more appropriate proxy for overall value maximization.139 This 
signals a scholarly effort to transition to a more dynamic understanding of 
the shareholder wealth maximization mandate. Yet, acknowledging that 
short-term shareholder wealth might not be an accurate proxy for aggregate 
wealth does not remove the use of shareholder value metrics for efficiency 
analysis altogether, as suggested by some scholars.140 Rather, it suggests 
that claims of societal efficiency (rather then mere shareholder efficiency) 
should rely less on event studies—which focus on short-term variations in 
measures of shareholder value—and more on studies that examine changes 
in such measures over the long term. Accordingly, our ability to rely on 
long-term changes in shareholder value positions our study to derive 
broader efficiency implications—advancing the understanding of the 
intertemporal aspects of the shareholder wealth maximization mandate as a 
means to an end, rather than as an end in itself. 
B. E-Index Provisions and Data Description 
Turning to our empirical analysis of corporate governance, we begin 
by briefly reviewing the specific institutional mechanisms that, according 
to BCF, would explain why each of the six E-Index provisions causes 
entrenchment. Understanding those institutional mechanisms is important 
as they underlie the broader policy implications BCF derive from the 
results obtained for the E-Index. After that, we present the data for our 
empirical investigation of those provisions. 
1. E-Index Provisions. 
a. Staggered boards.—In a staggered board, directors are 
grouped into different classes (usually three),141 with each class standing for 
reelection in successive years, unlike in a unitary board,142 where directors 
 
139 See, e.g., COLIN MAYER, FIRM COMMITMENT: WHY THE CORPORATION IS FAILING US AND 
HOW TO RESTORE TRUST IN IT 246–47 (2013); Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Essay, Reforming 
Executive Compensation: Focusing and Committing to the Long-Term, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 359, 359 
(2009); Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We Face: Can 
Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also Act and Think 
Long Term?, 66 BUS. LAW. 1, 3 (2010). But see Jessie M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for Favoring Long-
Term Shareholders, 124 YALE L.J. 1554, 1560 (2015). 
140 See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder 
Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 674 (2006) (criticizing the use of shareholder value metrics as proxies for 
overall firm value). 
141 See Richard H. Koppes et al., Corporate Governance Out of Focus: The Debate over Classified 
Boards, 54 BUS. LAW. 1023, 1029 & n.21 (1999). 
142 A unitary board structure is the default in all states, except for Massachusetts, Indiana, and 
Iowa, where the default is reversed. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (2015); MODEL BUS. CORP. 
ACT § 8.05 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010); see also IND. CODE § 23-1-33-6(c) (2015) (default board is 
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serve a one-year term. When the staggering provision is in the charter, as is 
typical, this requires challengers in a proxy contest to win at least two 
election cycles to gain a board majority.143 This delay raises costs for a 
challenger and would explain why staggered boards have come to be 
regarded as a “powerful defense against removal” of incumbents.144 
b. Three supermajority requirements.—Three separate 
supermajority requirements make up the E-Index. Similar to staggered 
boards, these provisions would share the common feature of limiting the 
shareholders’ ability to use voting rights “to have their way” in corporate 
affairs.145 In particular, supermajority requirements to amend the bylaws 
(supermajority bylaws) could considerably strengthen the effectiveness of a 
target’s defenses, preventing challengers from removing defenses that 
incumbents previously placed in the bylaws.146 Supermajority requirements 
to amend the charter (supermajority charter) and supermajority 
requirements for mergers (supermajority mergers) are instead described by 
BCF as providing “a second line of defense” against takeovers by allowing 
insiders with a control block to defeat charter amendments or mergers even 
if they have lost control of the board.147 
c. Poison pills.—A poison pill consists of stock purchase 
rights, which are granted to existing shareholders in the event a corporate 
raider accumulates more than a certain threshold of outstanding stock, and 
which entitle the shareholders (but not the raider) to acquire newly issued 
stock at a substantial discount from the market price.148 Hence, by 
significantly diluting a bidder’s economic rights, a poison pill prevents 
hostile bidders from being successful unless the bidder can have the pill 
redeemed by a majority of newly appointed directors. However, if the 
target also has a staggered board in place, a bidder is required to wait 
through two annual elections before being able to do so. This would 
 
staggered); IOWA CODE § 490.806A (2015) (same); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156D, § 8.06(b)–(g) (2015) 
(same). 
143 Dismantling a staggered board established in the charter, rather than the bylaws, involves the 
coordinated action of the board and the shareholders, as charter amendments can only be initiated by the 
board and require shareholder approval. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b) (2015); MODEL BUS. 
CORP. ACT § 10.03 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010). 
144 Bebchuk et al., supra note 12, at 791.  
145 Id.  
146 See id. at 792. 
147 Id.  
148 See Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, The Share Purchase Rights Plan, in RONALD J. GILSON & 
BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 58–65 (2d ed. Supp. 2003) 
(setting forth the terms of a standard poison pill). 
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explain why poison pills are generally regarded as having “considerably 
strengthened the protections against replacement that incumbents have.”149 
d. Golden parachutes.—A golden parachute is an executive 
pay component that entitles its beneficiaries to substantial payments 
following a change in control of their company, “sweetening” the adverse 
effects such a change imposes on management.150 While recognizing the 
existence of several explanations for the adoption of golden parachutes, 
BCF state that they “might also have an adverse effect by increasing slack 
on the part of managers as a result of being less subject to discipline by the 
market for corporate control.”151 
2. Data Description.—Our data for examining the E-Index 
provisions comes from several sources, with the overall data sample 
covering 2186 large publicly traded U.S. firms (i.e., firms in the S&P 1500) 
for the time period 1978–2008. In particular, we obtain data for SM 
Charter, SM Bylaws, SM Merger, and Parachutes (all indicator variables 
for the presence of the respective governance provision)152 from two main 
sources. For the time period 1990–2008, we use the corporate governance 
dataset maintained by Risk Metrics, which acquired the former Investor 
Responsibility Research Center (IRRC).153 For the period 1978–1989, we 
use a dataset constructed by one of us for an earlier coauthored study that 
provides information on the same provisions tracked by the IRRC for the 
period 1990–2008, including the five provisions of interest.154 For Poison 
Pill and Staggered Board (two indicator variables for the presence of a 
poison pill and a staggered board, respectively), we instead obtain data for 
the period 1978–2011 from the dataset used in the finance companion of 
the Cremers–Sepe study.155 We give equal weight to all provisions, 
attributing one point for each provision a firm has, as BCF did when 
constructing the E-Index.156 
 
149 Bebchuk et al., supra note 12, at 792.  
150 See generally Simone M. Sepe & Charles K. Whitehead, Rethinking Chutes: Incentives, 
Investment, and Innovation, 95 B.U. L. REV. 2027, 2036–43 (2015) (providing an exhaustive 
description of golden parachutes’ terms and practice). 
151 Bebchuk et al., supra note 12, at 793. 
152 Variables are briefly explained in Appendix Table A and descriptive statistics are provided in 
Appendix Table B.  
153 BCF also used data from IRRC for the period 1990–2002. Bebchuk et al., supra note 12, at 
796–97. 
154 See Cremers & Ferrell, supra note 132, at 1168. 
155 See Cremers et al., supra note 117. 
156 See Bebchuck et al., supra note 12, at 798. 
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Since our main focus is on the value relevance of corporate 
governance, the main dependent variable in our analysis is firm value. 
Consistent with many prior studies investigating the relationship between 
governance arrangements and firm value, including the BCF study, we 
measure firm value using Tobin’s Q (Q),157 retrieving data from 
Compustat.158 
Finally, to control for factors other than the adoption of the six 
provisions included in the E-Index that could have an impact on firm value, 
we always include the following standard controls using Compustat data: 
the log of the book value of total assets (Assets), the return on assets 
calculated as the ratio of the firm’s EBITDA159 over the book value of total 
assets (ROA), the ratio of capital expenditures over the book value of total 
assets (CAPX), the ratio of research and development expenditures over 
sales (R&D), and, finally, a proxy of merger and acquisition activity at the 
industry level (Industry M&A Volume).160 
C. Incidence of the E-Index Provisions 
We begin our reexamination of the E-Index by documenting the 
incidence of each of its six components in our sample of firms in Figure 1 
below. 
 
157 Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets. See Eugene F. 
Fama & Kenneth R. French, Testing Trade-off and Pecking Order Predictions About Dividends and 
Debt, 15 REV. FIN. STUD. 1, 8 (2002). Tobin’s Q has become a commonly recognized proxy for market 
valuation. See, e.g., Larry H.P. Lang & René M. Stulz, Tobin’s q, Corporate Diversification, and Firm 
Performance, 102 J. POL. ECON. 1248, 1249–50 (1994); Randall Morck et al., Management Ownership 
and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 293, 294 (1988); David Yermack, 
Higher Market Valuation of Companies with a Small Board of Directors, 40 J. FIN. ECON. 185, 186 
(1996). 
158 A database of various types of information on companies throughout the world, provided by 
S&P Capital IQ, a division of McGraw Hill Financial, Inc. 
159 Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization. 
160 In the cross-sectional analysis, we also include a control for whether the firm is incorporated in 
Delaware. See infra Table 1. In the time-series analysis, we omit this control, as it is absorbed by the 
control for firm fixed effects, i.e., the inclusion of a dummy variable for each firm. See infra Table 2. 
Further, as standard in the literature, we also exclude firms with a dual class structure, as concentrated 
ownership tends to insulate managers and renders other protective features relatively unimportant. See 
Bebchuk et al., supra note 12, at 797. We also exclude financial firms, as the corporate governance of 
such firms differs due to heavy federal regulation. While we keep real estate investment trusts (REITs) 
(i.e., firms with a SIC Code of 6798) in our data, running our regressions on a subset excluding REITs 
yields similar results throughout. This excludes that REITs’ special governance features may drive our 
results. 
110-4 CREMERS-MASCONALE-SEPE MASTER COPY II (CLEAN).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/24/2016 2:41 PM 
110:727 (2016) Commitment and Entrenchment in Corporate Governance 
759 
FIGURE 1: INCIDENCE OF THE E-INDEX PROVISIONS (1978–2008) 
We observe that since the mid-1980s, staggered boards, poison pills, 
and golden parachutes have been the most commonly used among the E-
Index provisions. In particular, staggered boards and poison pills are 
characterized by a similar pattern. They both exhibit a slow trend from 
1978 to 1984, which rapidly accelerates starting in 1985 and lasts until the 
early 1990s. This seems not coincidental; the Delaware courts first made 
clear that the use of the pill was legitimate in the 1985 decision of Moran v. 
Household International, Inc.161 With that legitimacy, the combined use of 
a staggered board and a poison pill acquired new force as a powerful 
antitakeover defense.162 Both staggered boards and poison pills then 
 
161 500 A.2d 1346, 1348–49, 1357 (Del. 1985). Moran held Delaware directors to the heightened 
form of judicial review established in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petrol. Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985), 
under which directors need to prove the reasonableness and good faith of their actions. Moran, 
500 A.2d at 1350 (citing Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954–55). That constraint, however, was weakened in the 
1989 decision of Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989), which 
substantially gave directors the right to maintain a poison pill indefinitely, essentially providing them 
with the ability to “just say no” to unsolicited bid acquisitions. Id. at 1154. 
162 See John C. Coates IV, Takeover Defenses in the Shadow of the Pill: A Critique of the Scientific 
Evidence, 79 TEX. L. REV. 271, 326 (2000). 
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stabilized in the 2000s, hovering at rates around 60% and 55% respectively. 
After 2006, they both begin to decline. For poison pills, however, this data 
needs to be interpreted with caution, as a board of directors can unilaterally 
adopt a pill at any time, so much so that it has become common in the 
literature to refer to the existence of “shadow” poison pills.163 Hence, the 
fact that after 2006 fewer firms in our samples have a poison pill cannot be 
unequivocally interpreted as indicating a declining use of such provisions. 
At best, one can infer a decline in the use of “visible” poison pills. 
Concerning golden parachutes, we first observe a steady increase 
during the 1978–1989 period—from virtually no firms in our sample 
having a golden parachute in 1978 to about 52% of the firms in our sample 
having such a provision in 1989. As the 1978–1989 period roughly 
coincides with the takeover era, the observed pattern would seem to lend 
support to BCF’s hypothesis that golden parachutes serve as an 
antitakeover defense.164 From 1989 to 1997, the ratio of firms with a golden 
parachute slightly declines, while it begins to increase again starting in 
1998 (although with a more discontinuous pattern than that observed 
during the 1978–1989 period), reaching 77% in 2008. The more recent rise 
in the use of golden parachutes is more difficult to reconcile with BCF’s 
antitakeover hypothesis. An alternative explanation for this rise, as 
suggested by one of us elsewhere, is increased competition among firms, 
which may justify the attribution of a parachute to attract talented managers 
to firms that are exposed to the risk of a change in control.165 We observe, 
however, that this explanation does not per se detract from BCF’s claim 
that golden parachutes entrench incumbents, as the production of that effect 
could be independent of the motivation behind the adoption of parachutes. 
Concerning supermajority requirements, SM Charter registers a very 
low incidence throughout our entire sample period, hovering at a rate 
between 3% and 9%.166 SM Bylaws also remains relatively stable, in the 
15%–20% range, throughout our entire 1978–2008 period (except for three 
years, from 1980 to 1982, where it falls below 10%). SM Merger, instead, 
exhibits a different pattern. Until the mid-1980s, SM Merger accounted for 
 
163 See id. at 288 (arguing that since the endorsement of the pill by Delaware courts, “all Delaware 
firms . . . have had a shadow pill in place, witting or not” (emphasis removed)).  
164 See supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
165 See Sepe & Whitehead, supra note 150, at 2060–61 (explaining that a talented manager would 
always prefer a firm that is less exposed to the risk of a change in control, absent the protection offered 
by golden parachutes, because the manager would be less exposed to the risk of being expropriated of 
her specific firm investment in such firms). 
166 BCF also document a low incidence of supermajority requirements for charter amendments in 
their sample. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 12, at 798. 
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the most widely used E-Index provision, whose incidence largely surpassed 
that of any other index provisions, including staggered boards. After 1978, 
however, the incidence of SM Merger begins to decline, stabilizing at a rate 
around 40% in the 1990s and further declining in the 2000s. 
These patterns seem to suggest that staggered boards and poison pills 
have progressively come to dominate over supermajority requirements—
and especially SM Merger—as defensive measures. Before the pill’s 
development in the 1980s, the deterrent effect of a staggered board is 
regarded as having been limited167 because its adoption could not prevent a 
bidder from acquiring a large block of shares; it could only delay a bidder’s 
ability to exercise voting control.168 This tactical weakness might have 
increased the defensive value of supermajority requirements, which would 
explain our results for the 1978–1985 period.169 After the introduction of 
the pill, however, supermajority requirements lost much of their defensive 
value, as a pill on its own could now deter any bid that such requirements 
would deter.170 Some scholars have thus argued that after the pill, the 
presence or absence of supermajority requirements has become irrelevant, 
with the result that most of these measures have disappeared.171 Yet, while 
we find that the incidence of SM Merger declines after the introduction of 
the pill, these provisions seem far from disappearing. Moreover, this 
account is also unable to explain the stable pattern we observe in our 
sample for SM Bylaws. 
D. Corporate Governance and Firm Value 
Moving to the core of our empirical analysis, in this Section we 
estimate the impact of the E-Index and each of its constituent provisions on 
firm value, presenting results for both cross-sectional and time-series 
analyses. As discussed earlier, both analyses are directed at verifying 
whether the E-Index’s theoretical proposition—that incumbents’ protection 
from removal epitomizes bad governance—holds over a much longer 
 
167 See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 13.6, at 576 (1986); Ronald J. Gilson, The 
Case Against Shark Repellent Amendments: Structural Limitations on the Enabling Concept, 34 STAN. 
L. REV. 775, 793 (1982). 
168 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: 
Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 903–04 (2002). 
169 In particular, Coates suggests that before the introduction of the pill, supermajority requirements 
for mergers might have provided a defense against coercive two-tiered tender offers—involving a 
higher initial offer for sufficient shares to acquire control, followed by a lower offer for the remaining 
outstanding shares. See Coates, supra note 162, at 321.  
170 See id. at 320–23. 
171 See id. at 324–25. 
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sample period. However, the use of a time-series analysis is better suited to 
mitigate possible endogeneity concerns as it incorporates firm fixed 
effects.172 
1. Cross-Sectional Results.—Table 1 presents our results for the 
cross-section of firms, including control for both industry and year fixed 
effects. Column (1) presents results for the association between the E-Index 
and firm value (Q). Columns (2) through (7) present results for the 
association between the single index provisions and firm value to explore 
the possibility that not all of the index provisions contribute—or contribute 
analogously—to the aggregate index’s relation to firm value.173 For added 
robustness, in Column (8) we verify the impact on Q of each E-Index 
provision while controlling for the other index provisions. We also note 
that in this Table (and Table 2 that follows), we show the absolute value of 
the t-statistics of all coefficients174 based on both robust standard errors that 
are not clustered, as in BCF, and clustered, as has become standard in more 
recent empirical studies. Indeed, the use of clustered standard errors is 
important because it addresses within-firm dependence, or correlations 
between observations of the same firm across years.175 
 
 
172 See supra notes 129–30 and accompanying text. 
173 See Bebchuk et al., supra note 12, at 805–06.  
174 T-statistics conventionally indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. This means that 
the null hypothesis (the hypothesis that an independent variable has no impact on a dependent variable) 
cannot be rejected with a probability of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. In statistics, when the 
significance level is above 10%, it is standard to consider the result to be statistically insignificant or 
uninformative. 
175 See Mitchell A. Petersen, Estimating Standard Errors in Finance Panel Data Sets: Comparing 
Approaches, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 435, 443 (2009).  
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TABLE 1: FIRM VALUE AND E-INDEX PROVISIONS: CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSIS† 
Dependent Variable: Q 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Independent Variables       
E-Index -0.0453***       
 (-11.45)        
 (-5.57)        
Staggered Board -0.0405***     -0.0234** 
  (-4.47)      (-2.06) 
  (-2.14)      (-1.03) 
Poison Pill  -0.0964***    -0.0722*** 
   (-9.54)     (-6.20) 
   (-4.72)     (-3.25) 
SM Charter   -0.00604   0.0216 
    (-0.23)    (0.77) 
    (-0.11)    (0.39) 
SM Bylaws    -0.0391***  -0.0256* 
     (-3.00)   (-1.84) 
     (-1.57)   (-0.99) 
SM Merger     -0.0207** -0.0139 
      (-1.99)  (-1.27) 
      (-0.95)  (-0.61) 
Parachutes      -0.113*** -0.0918*** 
      (-10.87) (-8.10) 
(-5.46) (-4.24) 
Fixed Effects: Year + Industry 
N 21,414 28,281 27,818 21,455 21,555 21,840 24,348 21,414 
R-sq 0.512 0.496 0.501 0.509 0.508 0.510 0.512 0.513 
† In this Table, we present the cross-sectional association between firm value and the level of the E-Index or its 
six constituent provisions, using pooled panel regressions of Q on the E-Index or its provisions with year and 
industry fixed effects (4-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code) plus a set of standard controls: 
Assets, Delaware Incorporation, ROA, CAPX, R&D, and Industry M&A Volume. All columns use the full time 
period 1978–2008, except Columns (2) and (3), which use data for 1978–2011. Coefficients on standard controls 
are not shown to save space. Variables are defined in Appendix Table A. Statistical significance of the 
coefficients is indicated at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels by ***, **, and *, respectively. We provide two t-statistics 
below each regression coefficient, namely first the t-statistic based on robust standard errors that are not 
clustered and, second, the t-statistics based on robust standard errors that are clustered by firm. The statistical 
significance indicated by ***, **, and *, refers to the first coefficient in parenthesis (i.e., robust standard errors that 
are not clustered). 
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Consistent with BCF, in Column (1) we document that the cross-
sectional coefficient of E-Index is negative and statistically significant—
suggesting that firms with more entrenchment experience a reduction in 
value as compared to firms with less entrenchment.176 
As shown in Columns (2) through (7), the cross-sectional coefficients 
of the single index provisions are likewise negative. The coefficients are 
also statistically significant for all provisions except SM Charter, which 
could be explained by the low incidence of such provisions throughout our 
sample.177 However, when we use robust standard errors clustered at firm 
level, both the coefficients of SM Merger and SM Bylaws become 
insignificant.178 The statistical significance of the cross-sectional 
coefficients of the single provisions is reduced even more when we control 
for the other E-Index provisions shown in Column (8). In particular, both 
the coefficients of SM Merger and SM Charter become insignificant. With 
clustering, the effect is even more evident, with all the coefficients 
becoming insignificant,179 but for those of Poison Pill and Parachutes. This 
seems to indicate that these two provisions largely drive the negative cross-
sectional association of the E-Index with firm value—consistent with our 
prediction that perhaps not all the provisions included in the E-Index matter 
equally for aggravating entrenchment. As we shall see next, the use of a 
time-series analysis delivers results that go in the same direction, 
challenging BCF’s view of incumbent protection from removal as being 
uniformly detrimental to firm value. 
 
176 Economically, firms with an E-Index that is a standard deviation higher than the mean tend to 
have a level of Q that is 3.7% lower relative to firms with an E-Index and Q that are at the mean. We 
calculate this economic significance as follows. First, we multiply the E-Index coefficient of -0.0453 
times the standard deviation of E-Index of 1.37, and then divide this by 1.69, which is the average Q in 
the sample. We also observe that the coefficient’s estimate on E-Index remains statistically significant 
based on using robust standard errors clustered at firm level, although the t-statistic decreases from 
11.45 to 5.57.  
177 See supra text accompanying note 166. 
178 The t-statistics based on robust standard errors that are clustered by firm of -0.95 for SM Merger 
and -1.57 for SM Bylaws are less significant than 10% confidence level and, in turn, are considered 
statistically insignificant. See supra note 174. 
179 Given the effect of clustering standard errors by firm on our cross-sectional results, a note on its 
use seems worthwhile. Using standard errors that are clustered by firm accounts for the tendency of 
governance provisions to be quite stable across time, whereas using standard errors that are not 
clustered amounts to assuming that observations for a given firm are independent across time. This 
independence assumption, however, has come to be recognized as inappropriate today, as it ignores a 
strong dependency of governance provisions across time for individual firms. See Petersen, supra note 
175, at 435. This means that using more conservative robust standard errors that are clustered by firm is 
more reflective of the actual confidence we can have in reported estimates. Accordingly, because all 
cross-sectional coefficients—except Poison Pill and Parachutes—become insignificant upon clustering 
standard errors by firm (and controlling for the use of other E-Index provisions), it seems to deliver a 
different picture of incumbent protection from removal than that described by BCF. 
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2. Time-Series Results.—Table 2 presents results for regressions 
that replace industry fixed effects with firm fixed effects, examining the 
association between firm value and changes that firms made in the E-Index 
provisions during the 1978–2008 period. Column (1) presents results for 
the association between E-Index and firm value, Columns (2) through (7) 
present results for the association between each of the E-Index provisions 
and firm value, and Column (8) simultaneously considers all six E-Index 
provisions. 
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TABLE 2: FIRM VALUE AND E-INDEX PROVISIONS: TIME-SERIES ANALYSIS† 
 
 
  
Dependent Variable: Q 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Independent Variables       
E-Index -0.0137**       
 (-2.13)        
 (-1.07)        
Staggered  Board 0.0706***     0.120*** 
  (5.06)      (6.14) 
  (2.30)      (2.96) 
Poison Pill  -0.0340***    -0.0377*** 
   (-3.00)     (-2.80) 
   (-1.58)     (-1.58) 
SM Charter 0.0748** 0.0743** 
    (2.21)    (2.04) 
    (1.21)    (1.15) 
SM Bylaws    -0.0382*  -0.0630*** 
     (-1.88)   (-2.99) 
     (-1.04)   (-1.66) 
SM Merger     0.0269* 0.0117 
      (1.69)  (0.70) 
      (0.82)  (0.35) 
Parachutes      -0.0497*** -0.0608*** 
       (-4.23) (-4.62) 
       (-2.37) (-2.67) 
Fixed Effects: Year + Firm 
    
N 21,414 28,281 27,818 21,455 21,555 21,840 24,348 21,414 
R-sq 0.743 0.734 0.735 0.743 0.743 0.743 0.740 0.744 
† In this Table, we present the time-series association between firm value and the level of the E-Index and its six 
constituent provisions, using pooled panel regressions of Q on the E-Index or its provision(s) with year and firm 
fixed effects plus a set of standard controls: Assets, ROA, CAPX, R&D, and Industry M&A Volume. All columns 
use the full time period of 1978–2008, except Columns (2) and (3), which use data for 1978–2011. Coefficients 
on standard controls are not shown to save space. Variables are defined in Appendix Table A. Statistical 
significance of the coefficients is indicated at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels by ***, **, and *, respectively. We 
provide two t-statistics below each regression coefficient, namely first the t-statistic based on robust standard 
errors that are not clustered and, second, the t-statistics based on robust standard errors that are clustered by firm. 
The statistical significance indicated by ***, **, and *, refers to the first coefficient in parenthesis (i.e., robust 
standard errors that are not clustered). 
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As shown by Table 2, in the firm fixed effect regressions, the 
coefficient of E-Index remains negative, but becomes statistically 
insignificant based on using robust standard errors clustered at firm level.180 
This suggests that once correlations between observations of the same firm 
across years are taken into account,181 there is no statistically significant 
evidence that firm value increases as the level of the E-Index decreases 
(nor, correspondingly, that firm value decreases as the level of the E-Index 
increases). 
Columns (2) through (7) document our most striking results. 
Consistent with the Cremers–Sepe study documenting a positive role of 
staggered boards, Column (2) shows a statistically significant positive 
time-series association between Staggered Board and Q.182 The economic 
magnitude of this positive association is also considerable, suggesting that 
the adoption of a staggered board is associated with an increase in firm 
value of 4.3%.183 The coefficient of Staggered Board remains strongly 
statistically significant, even using robust standard errors clustered at firm 
level. Similarly, Columns (4) and (6) show a positive coefficient of SM 
Charter and SM Merger, although both coefficients become statistically 
insignificant when we use clustering by firm.184 
Conversely, the coefficients of Poison Pill, SM Bylaws, and 
Parachutes remain negative. The economic magnitude of these negative 
associations is also considerable, especially for Poison Pill and Parachutes. 
Indeed, the adoption of a poison pill is associated with a decrease in firm 
value of 2.1%,185 which remains marginally statistically significant when 
we use robust standard errors clustered at the firm level.186 The adoption of 
a golden parachute is associated with a similar decrease in firm value of 
 
180 The t-statistics based on robust standard errors that are clustered by firm of -1.07 for E-Index is 
less significant than 10% confidence level and thus considered statistically insignificant. See supra note 
174. 
181 See supra note 179. 
182 See Cremers & Sepe, supra note 18, at 101 tbl.1. 
183 The economic significance of the time-series impact of Staggered Board on Q is obtained by 
dividing the regression coefficient of 0.0706 by the sample average Q during 1978–2011 of 1.65.  
184 The t-statistics based on robust standard errors that are clustered by firm of 1.21 for SM Charter 
and of 0.82 for SM Merger are less significant than 10% confidence level and then considered 
statistically insignificant. See supra note 174. 
185 The economic significance of the time-series impact of Poison Pill on Q is obtained by dividing 
the regression coefficient of -0.034 by the sample average Q during 1978–2011 of 1.65.  
186 The t-statistics based on robust standard errors that are clustered by firm of -1.58 for Poison Pill 
are close but marginally lower than being significant at the 10% confidence level. 
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2.9%,187 which remains statistically significant when we used robust 
standard errors clustered at the firm level. 
Importantly, the results for both the E-index provisions exhibiting a 
positive impact and a negative impact on firm value are confirmed in 
Column (8), where we simultaneously consider the time-series association 
with firm value for all six E-Index provisions—with most coefficients 
becoming considerably stronger. The exception is SM Merger, whose 
coefficient decreases (from 0.0269 in Column (2) to 0.0117 in Column (8)). 
This suggests that the adoption of supermajority mergers serves a function 
to some extent independent of the adoption of a staggered board, in contrast 
to what is argued by some corporate law scholars.188 
Empirically, the conflicting signs of the cross-sectional versus the 
time-series results for Staggered Boards, SM Charter, and SM Merger 
seem to suggest that the cross-sectional results for these provisions may be 
due to reverse causality. In other words, a relatively low firm value would 
induce firms to adopt such provisions, rather than the other way around.189 
Most importantly, from an institutional perspective, our time-series 
evidence challenges BCF’s postulate that any form of protection from 
removal is a logical antecedent to managerial moral hazard, documenting 
that half of the E-Index provisions are associated with an increase, rather 
than a decrease, in firm value. Thus, as we explain in the following Section, 
the problem seems not to lie with incumbent protection from removal per 
se, but rather in the form this protection takes. 
3. “Dictatorial” and “Republican” Protection 
Arrangements.—Shareholder advocates, starting with Gompers, 
Ishii, and Metrick, have consistently portrayed the shareholder-centric 
model as an efficient form of direct corporate democracy, while portraying 
the board-centric model as an inefficient corporate dictatorship, where 
incumbents can arbitrarily secure their protection from removal at the 
expense of shareholders.190 This stylized representation of incumbent 
protection, however, is ill suited to capture all the governance arrangements 
 
187 The economic significance of the time-series impact of Parachutes on Q is obtained by dividing 
the regression coefficient of -0.0497 by the sample average Q during 1978–2008 of 1.69. 
188 See supra text accompanying note 171. 
189 The evidence documented by the Cremers–Sepe study that reverse causality is the most likely 
explanation for the conflict between the cross-sectional and time-series analysis of the value impact of 
staggered boards adds to the hypothesis that reverse causality might likewise explain our results for 
Staggered Boards, SM Charter, and SM Merger. See Cremer & Sepe, supra note 18, 103–04 (citing 
Cremers et al., supra note 117). 
190 See supra text accompanying notes 76–77.  
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included in the E-Index. Indeed, it fails to consider that some of these 
arrangements are premised on prior shareholder agreement, consistent with 
republican organizational principles, under which any form of power is 
bilateral and only vested in the elected representatives with the prior 
agreement of voters. 
This more nuanced representation of incumbent protection from 
removal is well suited to capture the difference between E-Index provisions 
with a negative and positive time-series association with firm value. Poison 
pills, golden parachutes, and supermajority bylaws all share the features of 
unilateral—and thus “dictatorial”—governance provisions. The board of 
directors can unilaterally adopt poison pills and golden parachutes, even 
against shareholder opposition.191 Similarly, in most companies, the initial 
charter tends to grant directors a unilateral right to amend the bylaws.192 
Although this practice cannot divest shareholders of their own unilateral 
right to amend the bylaws (which, under Delaware law, is the default),193 
the power attributed to directors becomes virtually exclusive when, in 
comparison, the exercise of the concurrent shareholders’ right is subject to 
a supermajority requirement.194 Indeed, under these combined governance 
arrangements, if the directors decide to amend the bylaws—for example, to 
add a provision that delays a bidder’s ability to replace a majority of the 
board195—it becomes much more difficult for the shareholders to reverse 
that decision. This is especially true considering that the size of 
supermajority requirements is often very high, up to 80%.196 
Conversely, staggered boards, supermajority charter, and 
supermajority mergers embody bilateral—and thus “republican”—
governance provisions as they are all premised on shareholder consent. In 
virtually every U.S. state, shareholder approval is required to adopt a 
staggered board.197 Further, while the board retains exclusive power to 
 
191 Bebchuk et al., supra note 12, at 809; see also Coates, supra note 162, at 287 n.62 
(“Technically, pill adoption is a dividend of rights to purchase stock. Dividends . . . are within the 
authority of the board and do not require shareholder approval.”). 
192 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (2015). 
193 Id.  
194 See id. § 242(b)(4). 
195 See generally John C. Coates IV, Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the 
Lawyers, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1301, 1346 (2001) (discussing limitations to shareholder powers).  
196 Scott Hirst, Frozen Charters 8 (2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.law.harvard.edu/
programs/olin_center/Prizes/2014-1.pdf [http://perma.cc/W5BR-XDH2]. 
197 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d). The notable exception is Maryland, where the board 
has the unilateral power to adopt a staggered board. See MD. CODE ANN. CORPS. & ASS’NS § 3-803 
(LexisNexis 2015). 
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initiate a charter amendment, shareholder approval is required.198 
Accordingly, rules for charter amendments are described as being 
characterized by a bilateral veto, i.e., neither the shareholders nor the board 
can amend the charter alone.199 The same logic of granting shareholders a 
veto right over fundamental corporate transactions explains the requirement 
of shareholder approval for mergers.200 
Distinguishing between unilateral and bilateral protection 
arrangements explains our time-series results.201 On the one hand, unilateral 
protection arrangements that can be adopted without any dialectical 
confrontation with the shareholders seem more likely to be motivated by 
managerial moral hazard—consistent with the negative association with 
firm value that we document. On the other hand, bilateral protection 
arrangements that require the prior agreement of shareholders seem to 
serve a constructive governance role, as we document that their adoption 
has a strongly positive association with firm value. 
We argue that this positive role is mitigating the limited commitment 
problem. Such a problem, as discussed earlier, is the result of the inability 
of public shareholders vested with strong exit rights and faced with 
discontinuous market prices to credibly commit to longer-term projects and 
stable stakeholder relationships, at the expense of firm profitability and, 
ultimately, their own interests.202 Staggered boards help mitigate the limited 
commitment problem by serving as a unique commitment device that 
makes it more difficult for shareholders to renege on prior long-term 
engagements and interfere with directorial and management decisions in 
the short term.203 
 
198 See supra note 143. 
199 See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Corporate Constitutionalism: Antitakeover Charter 
Provisions as Precommitment, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 517 n.175 (2003). 
200 See id. at 517.  
201 We are not the first to distinguish between unilateral and bilateral protection arrangements, 
although we are the first to provide empirical evidence supporting the conclusion that bilateral 
protection arrangements are more likely to be welfare enhancing than unilateral ones. See, e.g., Ronald 
J. Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer Defense, 35 STAN. L. REV. 
51, 51 (1982) (first suggesting that defensive tactics that require shareholder approval, such as 
staggered boards, may represent an efficient commitment from shareholders to managers and boards not 
to dismiss these agents prematurely, but tactics that do not require board approval may inefficiently 
reduce shareholder value); Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and 
Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 901–08 (2002) (drawing a 
distinction between the bilateral and unilateral devices that market participants used to respond to the 
takeover shock of the 1980s, and suggesting that bilateral devices hold a privileged position within 
Delaware law). 
202 See supra text accompanying notes 118–19.  
203 See supra text accompanying note 120. 
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Along the same lines, supermajority charter and supermajority merger 
provisions add to a firm’s commitment to the longer term by introducing a 
bias in favor of institutional stability.204 Indeed, requiring that any changes 
to basic institutional rules (such as those included in a firm’s charter or 
regulating the approval of mergers) receive both board support and 
overwhelming shareholder consensus helps promote the organizational 
conservatism that is necessary to strengthen a firm’s commitment towards 
longer-term stakeholder relationship and value creation.205 
III. THE VALUE OF COMMITMENT 
Our analysis of the E-Index, which expands the original analysis 
carried out by BCF to cover over thirty years of corporate governance, 
challenges the proposition that any form of incumbent protection from 
removal is detrimental to shareholder value. Contrary to this proposition, 
our time-series results suggest that only unilateral protection arrangements, 
which the board can adopt without the need for shareholder approval, result 
in value-decreasing entrenchment, or bad governance.206 Instead, bilateral 
protection arrangements, which require the mutual agreement of the board 
and the shareholders, promote beneficial commitment to longer-term value 
creation and stronger stakeholder relationships, or good governance.207 
In this Part, we put our novel account of what matters in corporate 
governance to further empirical testing. First, we decompose the E-Index 
into two separate sub-indices: a “commitment index” (C-Index), only 
including the E-Index’s three bilateral provisions, and an “incumbent 
index” (I-Index), only including the E-Index’s three unilateral provisions. If 
our account of corporate governance is correct, we expect to find that 
increased scores on the C-Index (i.e., more commitment) are associated 
with increases in firm value. Conversely, increased scores on the I-Index 
(i.e., more entrenchment) should be associated with decreases in firm 
value. Second, we verify whether the use of bilateral protection 
arrangements is more valuable in firms where the limited commitment 
problem appears to be more severe, as predicted by our theory. As 
 
204 This is a classic argument in political science for the adoption of supermajority requirements. 
See MELISSA SCHWARTZBERG, COUNTING THE MANY: THE ORIGINS AND LIMITS OF SUPERMAJORITY 
RULE 7–9, 125–33 (2014) (stating that modern supermajority rules are primarily regarded as a remedy 
against the “instability” of majority rules). 
205 Cf. id. at 127 (“Stable institutions afford us the security of expectations . . . . By protecting the 
institutions that ‘constitute’ our political arrangements, we can enable ordinary political life . . . without 
constantly renegotiating the ‘rules of the game.’”). 
206 See supra text accompanying notes 185–87. 
207 See supra text accompanying notes 182–84. 
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discussed below, for both inquiries, we find results that strongly support 
our novel account of incumbent protection from removal. 
A. The Commitment Index and the Incumbent Index 
In this Section, we test the value associations of two sub-indices of the 
E-Index: the C-Index, which is meant to capture the level of shareholder 
commitment to the long term, and the I-Index, which is meant to capture a 
firm’s level of entrenchment. 
Table 3 presents our results. Columns (1) through (3) present results 
for our full period, 1978–2008. After that, we perform subsample analyses 
to establish the robustness of our results across different sample periods. 
Specifically, Columns (4) through (6) present results for the first part of our 
sample, 1978–1993, while Columns (7) through (9) present results for the 
second part of our sample, 1994–2008. For all columns of this table, we 
include year and fixed effects and provide the t-statistics based on robust 
standard errors that are clustered at firm level. 
TABLE 3: FIRM VALUE, THE C-INDEX, AND THE I-INDEX† 
Dependent Variable: Q 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Time Period: 
1978–2008 
Time Period: 
1978–1993 
Time Period: 
1994–2008 
Independent Variables        
C-Index 0.0508** 0.0610** 0.0164 0.0141 0.0952**  0.101** 
 (2.04) (2.45) (0.75) (0.63) (2.18)  (2.34) 
I-Index -0.0432*** -0.0496***  0.0108 0.0109  -0.0328 -0.0372* 
 (-2.81) (-3.19)  (0.59) (0.57)  (-1.58) (-1.80) 
Fixed Effects:                                   Year + Firm 
           N 21,438 21,555 21,414 6,663 6,780 6,639 14,775 14,775 14,775 
R-sq 0.743 0.743 0.743 0.828 0.825 0.828 0.765 0.765 0.765 
† In this Table, we present the time-series association between firm value and the level of the C-Index and the I-
Index, using pooled panel regressions of Q on each index with year and firm fixed effects plus a set of standard 
controls: Assets, ROA, CAPX, R&D, and Industry M&A Volume. The first three columns use the full time period 
1978–2008, Columns (4)–(6) use data for 1978–1993, and Columns (7)–(9) for 1994–2008. Coefficients on 
standard controls are not shown to save space. Variables are defined in Appendix Table A. Statistical significance of 
the coefficients is indicated at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels by ***, **, and *, respectively, based on robust standard 
errors that are clustered by firm. 
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Consistent with our commitment theory of bilateral protection 
arrangements, in Column (1), which shows results for our full sample, we 
document a statistically significant positive time-series association between 
C-Index and Q. The economic magnitude of this positive association is also 
considerable, suggesting that a unit increase in C-Index is associated with 
an increase in firm value of 3.0%.208 Correspondingly, in Column (2), 
which shows the time-series relation between firm value and I-Index for 
our full sample, we document a statistically significant negative time-series 
association between I-Index and Q. The economic magnitude of this 
negative association is also considerable, suggesting that a unit increase in 
I-Index is associated with a decrease in firm value of 2.6%.209 These results 
are confirmed by Column (3), where we simultaneously consider both 
indices, finding that C-Index continues to have a statistically significant 
positive time-series association with Q, while I-Index continues to have a 
statistically significant negative time-series association with Q.210 
Results for the subperiod 1978–1993, shown in Columns (4) through 
(6), are considerably different. Indeed, all the C-Index and the I-Index 
coefficients—whether used singularly or simultaneously—become 
economically smaller and statistically insignificant. Conversely, results for 
the subperiod 1994–2008 are even stronger than the results we obtain for 
the full 1978–2008 period. As shown in Column (7), the coefficient of C-
Index is positive and statistically significant, and almost twice the 
coefficient of C-Index for our full time period. Economically, this means 
that a unit increase in C-Index is associated with an increase in firm value 
of 5.2% during the 1994–2008 time period.211 Concerning the coefficient of 
 
208 The economic significance of the impact of C-Index on Q is obtained by dividing the regression 
coefficient of 0.0508 by the sample average Q during 1978–2008 of 1.69. 
209 The economic significance of the impact of I-Index on Q is obtained by dividing the regression 
coefficient of -0.0432 by the sample average Q during 1978–2008 of 1.69. 
210 As we show in Appendix Table C, the results in Table 3 are not all driven by time variation in 
Staggered Board, Poison Pill, and Parachutes, even if those three provisions have the most time 
variation (as shown in Figure 1) and have the strongest time-series association with firm value (as 
documented in Table 2). Columns (1) and (3) of Appendix Table C show that adoption of SM Charter is 
associated with an increase in Q, but primarily for firms without a staggered board. Columns (2) and (3) 
show a similar result for SM Merger, albeit with lower economic significance and without statistical 
significance respectively. In Columns (4) and (6), we find a strong negative association between 
adopting SM Bylaw and Q, but only for firms that also have adopted a poison pill, suggesting a strong 
complementarity. Finally, as shown in Columns (5) and (6) of Appendix Table C, golden parachutes 
and poison pills appear to be substitutes, as we find that the adoption of Parachutes is strongly 
negatively related to Q, but only for firms that have not adopted a poison pill. 
211 The economic significance of the impact of C-Index on Q is obtained by dividing the regression 
coefficient of 0.0952 by the sample average Q during 1994–2008 of 1.82. 
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I-Index, as shown in Column (8), it remains negative, although it is only 
marginally significant. This could potentially be explained by more limited 
within-firm variation in the I-Index over this time period. Finally, as shown 
in Column (9), where we verify the contemporaneous impact of the two 
indices during 1994–2008, we similarly find that that the coefficient of C-
Index is positive and statistically significant and that the coefficient of I-
Index is negative and statistically significant. 
Overall, the results of Table 3 suggest that the divide between good 
and bad governance practices—as embodied by bilateral protection 
arrangements and unilateral protection arrangements, respectively—has 
only emerged in the past two decades. Conversely, before the mid-1990s, 
firms’ governance quality seems best understood as context-specific, where 
heterogeneity in governance arrangements may have reflected firms’ 
idiosyncratic features. Indeed, the insignificance of the results using the 
1978–1993 period is not just of a statistical nature, but also economical, as 
shown by the small (in absolute value) coefficients. This raises the question 
of what caused corporate governance to transition from a system in which 
best practices exhibited highly customized features to one in which 
bilateral protection arrangements seem to represent an appropriate set of 
best practices for most firms—and, conversely, unilateral protection 
arrangements seem to represent universally bad practices. We turn to that 
question next. 
B. The Dynamics of Incumbent Protection 
The erosion of the traditional board-centric model due to the rise of 
shareholder power—which started in the mid-1990s with the emergence of 
institutional investor ownership212—seems to provide a plausible answer to 
the question of what caused bilateral protection arrangements to 
progressively gain systematic value as best practices. With its strong focus 
on board authority and the central discretionary function of management 
over capital (i.e., shareholders), the traditional, managerialist model of U.S. 
corporations was well suited to constrain the distortions arising from the 
limited commitment problem.213 Indeed, under these organizational 
principles, directors were naturally empowered to resist short-term 
shareholder and market pressure.214 This, in turn, could explain why the 
 
212 See supra note 108. 
213 See supra notes 39–46 and accompanying text.  
214 As observed by Delaware Justice Jack Jacobs, in the management corporation, directors could 
force investors to “patiently ‘sit still’” for the time required “to innovate new products, to bring those 
products to market, and to plan for the long term.” Jacobs, supra note 60, at 1646–49. 
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benefits arising from the adoption of bilateral protection arrangements do 
not exhibit a systematic nature under that model. In the shareholder 
empowerment era, however, U.S. corporate boards have grown 
increasingly disempowered vis-à-vis shareholders.215 As a result, the 
limited commitment problem emerges as much more severe today. This 
could explain why the adoption of governance arrangements fostering 
commitment to the long term has become systematically valuable in more 
recent times. In other words, bilateral protection arrangements would have 
emerged as a means to re-empower boards—with the agreement and in the 
longer-term interest of shareholders—to constrain the distortions arising 
from the limited commitment problem. 
As to unilateral protection arrangements, such as poison pills and 
golden parachutes, one possible explanation for their emergence after 1993 
as seemingly universally bad practices relates to changes in takeover 
activity. During the takeover era, it was more likely that the need to address 
an actual takeover threat motivated the adoption of a poison pill. To the 
extent that such a threat could jeopardize a firm’s commitment to long-term 
value creation, a poison pill could provide incumbents with an exceptional 
remedy—to be added on top of already empowered boards—to force 
investors to be “patient.”216 With the end of the hostile takeover era in the 
mid-1990s, however, similar threats have become much less frequent, 
making it more likely that the adoption of a poison pill may be motivated 
by managerial moral hazard. 
It is important to emphasize, however, that so far, for simplicity, we 
have assumed that a firm is to adopt only good or bad governance 
arrangements. In actuality, however, it will often be the case that a firm has 
some good arrangements and some bad ones. For example, a firm might 
have adopted—as often happens in practice—both a staggered board and a 
poison pill. How should one interpret this organizational variant under our 
account of corporate governance? Our analysis of the results obtained for 
the I-Index suggests that evaluation of this variant should turn on whether 
any actual takeover threat justifies the adoption of a pill to strengthen the 
 
215 See supra text accompanying note 62.  
216 In the Delaware Court of Chancery’s ruling of the Paramount Communications Inc. v. Time Inc. 
takeover case (later affirmed by the Delaware Supreme Court), Chancellor Allen provided a similar 
motivation. See Nos. 10866, 10670, 10935, 1989 WL 79880, at *30 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989), aff’d, 
571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989). Framing the case as hinging on whether Time’s directors were allowed to 
accept less current value today in the hope of greater value in the future, Chancellor Allen ruled in favor 
of the board’s use of the pill as a manifestation of the board’s willingness to manage the corporation for 
the long-term profit. Id. Further, earlier poison pills also contained bilateral features that disappeared in 
later pills, as shareholders were typically permitted to remove the pill under the former’s standard 
provisions. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 201, at 910.  
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long-term commitment device provided by a staggered board. A recent case 
on point is the use by takeover target Airgas of a poison pill to defeat Air 
Products’ attempt to win over the company.217 After a battle that drew 
massive investor attention, Airgas was able to successfully fend off Air 
Products’ offer following a ruling by the Delaware Chancery Court that 
upheld the company’s use of the pill as consistent with the objective of 
long-term value creation.218 Tellingly, in the months after the ruling, 
Airgas’s stock price rose steadily, validating the view of the Airgas 
staggered board that the use of the pill was necessary to defend the 
company’s “commit[ment] to creating shareholder value through the 
disciplined execution of core business strategies.”219 
Finally, concerning the use of golden parachutes, the 2010 
introduction by the Dodd–Frank Act of “Say-on-Golden-Parachute” rules 
has weakened the unilateral nature of these provisions. Pursuant to 
Section 951 of the Act, all U.S. public companies are now required to 
conduct a nonbinding shareholder advisory vote on parachute payouts in 
connection with mergers and other significant corporate transactions that 
are presented to the shareholders for approval.220 Our account of corporate 
governance suggests that by introducing an element of dialectical 
confrontation with the shareholders, this legal change could potentially 
serve to mitigate the likelihood that golden parachutes be primarily 
motivated by managerial moral hazard. Consistent with this hypothesis, one 
of us has argued elsewhere—with the support of empirical evidence for the 
2007–2012 period—that golden parachutes have grown into a governance 
arrangement designed to ensure managers will benefit from the long-term 
value of their specific investments, even if their company is later 
acquired.221 As encouraging managers to specifically invest in the firm is 
 
217 See Steven M. Davidoff, A Case Study: Air Products v. Airgas and the Value of Strategic 
Judicial Decision-Making, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 502, 507–33 (providing an exhaustive account 
of the Airgas–Air Products battle). 
218 The Delaware Chancery Court initially upheld a shareholder-initiated bylaw amendment that 
accelerated the date of Airgas’s next annual shareholder meeting—substantially shortening the two-
annual-meeting delay forced on Air Products by Airgas’s staggered board. Airgas, Inc. v. Air Prods. & 
Chems., Inc., No. 5817-CC, 2010 WL 3960599, at *1 (Del. Ch. Oct. 8, 2010). About a month later, 
however, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed the Chancery decision and held that measures designed 
to shorten the terms of service of staggered directors were impermissible. Airgas, Inc. v. Air Prods. & 
Chems., Inc., 8 A.3d 1182, 1185 (Del. 2010).  
219 The History of Airgas: It’s All About Value, AIRGAS, http://airgas.com/company/history/airgas-
history-commitment-to-excellence-all-about-value.html [http://perma.cc/VE3Z-PXF3]. 
220 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, sec. 951, 
§ 14A(a)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 1899 (2010) (codified as amended 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1 (2012)). 
221 See Sepe & Whitehead, supra note 150, at 2048–49 (“[C]hutes serve as a kind of insurance 
against a prospective change in the firm’s investment strategy, and a chute’s payments—similar to 
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essential to creating and sustaining firm value over time, the benefits 
derived from such assurance would accrue to managers and shareholders 
alike, which could explain why the use of golden parachutes kept 
increasing after 2008.222 
C. Managerial and Stakeholder Engagement 
Our results for the C-Index and the I-Index largely downplay the 
relevance of incumbent protection from removal that is detrimental to 
shareholder interests. That protection appears to be beneficial to 
shareholder and societal interests, as long as it empowers boards to resist 
short-term market pressure with the prior agreement of shareholders (or 
even without shareholder agreement if this is justified by exceptional 
circumstances). 
As a further test to our novel account of incumbent protection from 
removal, in this Section we verify the channels through which bilateral 
protection arrangements (i.e., the republican board-centric model) would 
add corporate value: the pursuit of long-term projects and firm-specific 
stakeholder investments. Empirically, if our theoretical account is correct, 
we would expect to find that the adoption of bilateral protection 
arrangements is more strongly associated with increases in firm value in 
firms whose corporate production depends on long-term innovation and the 
participation of stakeholders, including creditors. 
1. Innovation and Stakeholder Participation.—Our theoretical 
account predicts that firms that are more involved in long-term innovation 
and where stronger firm-specific investments by nonfinancial stakeholders 
(such as customers and employees) are likely to be more important should 
be affected by a more severe limited commitment problem. Indeed, 
information about investments in innovation tends to be “soft,” that is, 
mostly limited to firm insiders and hence less accurately captured by 
 
specified (or liquidated) damages—reflect the loss to managers of the value resulting from their sunk 
costs.” (footnote omitted)). 
222 See id. (empirically documenting that the adoption of a golden parachute was positively 
associated with firm value for a sample of firms during the time period 2007–2012). According to 
research done for a forthcoming coauthored work of one of us, the increase in golden parachutes might 
have been more significant than it appears pursuant to the RiskMetrics data. Indeed, in hand-checking 
RiskMetrics data, this work finds that RiskMetrics appears to have underreported the levels of golden 
parachutes for the period starting in 2008. E-mail from Martijn Cremers, Professor of Fin., Mendoza 
Coll. of Bus., Univ. of Notre Dame, to Simone Sepe, Professor of Law & Fin., James E. Rogers Coll. of 
Law, Univ. of Ariz. (Sept. 30, 2015, 3:41 PM) (on file with Northwestern University Law Review).  
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market prices in the short term.223 This increases the risk that shareholders 
may misinterpret a short-term drop in profits to be a sign of 
underperformance when, instead, it reflects the expenses of an attractive 
investment whose value will not be realized until later.224 
Similarly, firms where the nature of the business requires more 
commitment between the corporation and one or more of its stakeholders 
should be more penalized by short-term shareholder pressure directed at 
seeking a change in investment policy or a change in control. A shareholder 
advocate could argue that contracts are a sufficient instrument to address 
the higher risk of stakeholder expropriation arising in such firms.225 
However, preventing stakeholder expropriation by contract can be 
impossibly difficult, as both the long-term nature of most stakeholder 
contracts and the complex and uncertain process of corporate production 
necessarily make such contracts highly incomplete.226 
Our working hypothesis is thus that firms with more long-term 
innovation and those that require stronger firm-specific investments by 
stakeholders should both benefit more from the adoption of the bilateral 
protection arrangements included in the C-Index. In order to capture these 
features of corporate production, we use the following variables: Research 
and Development (R&D), Labor Productivity, and Large Customer. R&D 
is a standard measure of innovation,227 which we use as a proxy for the 
importance of long-term research and development projects.228 Labor 
Productivity identifies industries with a higher marginal product of labor 
and, hence, we use it as proxy for the level of firm-specific investments by 
 
223 See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 249–50 (defining soft information as 
information that cannot be easily verified even when it is disclosed); Alex Edmans et al., The Real 
Costs of Financial Efficiency When Some Information Is Soft 2 (European Corp. Governance Inst., 
Finance Working Paper No. 380/2013, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2316194 [http://perma.cc/8UPK-M2XU] (describing information on intangible assets as a 
classic example of soft information that cannot be credibly disclosed to outsiders). 
224 See supra text accompanying notes 118–19. 
225 For a long time now, this has been shareholder advocates’ standard response to the risk of 
stakeholder expropriation by shareholders. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the 
Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary 
Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23, 25 (1991) (arguing that the contracting problems facing “[o]ther 
constituencies . . . can be solved at far less cost than those confronting shareholders”). 
226 See Cremers & Sepe, supra note 18, at 121–23.  
227 See generally Edwin Mansfield, R&D and Innovation: Some Empirical Findings, in NAT’L 
BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, R&D, PATENTS, AND PRODUCTIVITY 127, 127–29 (Zvi Griliches ed., 
1984), http://www.nber.org/chapters/c10047.pdf [https://perma.cc/JZJ6-C25C]. 
228 Data for R&D is from Compustat.  
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the employees.229 Finally, Large Customer is an indicator variable set equal 
to one if the firm has at least one customer accounting for 10% or more of 
its sales,230 which we use as a proxy for the importance of (long-term) firm 
customers in creating financial value.231 
Table 4 shows the results of pooled panel Q regressions on the E-
Index, the C-Index, and the I-Index with and without the interactions with 
the above proxies (plus our standard controls, whose coefficients are not 
shown to save space). For all columns of this Table, as well as of Table 5 
below, we include year and fixed effects and provide the t-statistics based 
on robust standard errors clustered at firm level. 
  
 
229 Data for Labor Productivity is at industry level and comes from the U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (using the four-digit SIC code). This data is available for only a subset of firms. 
230 See Johnson et al., supra note 120, at 316. 
231 Data for Large Customer comes from the historic Compustat Segment tapes for 1986–2007. 
About a quarter of firms in our sample have a Large Customer.  
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TABLE 4: INDICES AND FIRM VALUE: COMMITMENT PROXIES INTERACTIONS† 
                                                 Dependent Variable: Q 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Independent Variables      
E-Index -0.0155  -0.0622***  -0.0173  
(-1.14) (-3.56) (-1.30) 
C-Index  0.0301  0.0382  0.0536*** 
  (1.17)  (1.03)  (4.44) 
I-Index  -0.0398**  -0.0921***  -0.0505*** 
  (-2.26)  (-4.06)  (-5.70) 
E-Index  -0.0489      
  ൈ	R&D (-0.16)      
C-Index  1.272*     
  ൈ R&D  (1.70)     
I-Index  -0.325     
  ൈ R&D  (-1.01)     
E-Index   0.0392***    
  ൈLabor Productivity  
Productivity  (4.37)    
C-Index    0.0441***   
  ൈ Labor Productivity 
PProdProd.Productivity   (3.27)   
I-Index 0.0333*** 
  ൈ Labor Productivity 
PeoProductivity   (2.67)   
E-Index     0.0156  
  ൈ Large Customer     (1.11)  
C-Index      0.0356** 
  ൈ Large Customer      (2.22) 
I-Index      0.00467 
  ൈ Large Customer      (0.39) 
R&D -0.587 -1.181 0.999* 1.003* 1.429** 1.447*** 
 (-0.62) (-1.18) (1.76) (1.77) (2.53) (4.00) 
Labor Productivity   -0.219*** -0.211***   
   (-6.25) (-6.02)   
Large Customer     -0.0893** -0.0920*** 
     (-2.02) (-3.41) 
Fixed Effects:                                                                 Year + Firm 
N 22,053 22,053 18,414 18,414 21,414 21,414 
R-sq 0.718 0.719 0.748 0.749 0.743 0.744 
† In this Table, we present the time-series association between firm value and three governance indices (the E-
Index, C-Index, and I-Index) and their interactions with three proxies of the importance of longer-term 
commitments: R&D, Labor Productivity, and Large Customer, using pooled panel regressions of Q with year 
and firm fixed effects plus a set of standard controls: Assets, ROA, CAPX, R&D, and Industry M&A Volume. All 
columns use the full time period 1978–2008. Coefficients on standard controls are not shown to save space. 
Variables are defined in Appendix Table A. Statistical significance of the coefficients is indicated at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels by ***, **, and *, respectively. We provide the t-statistics below each regression coefficient based 
on robust standard errors that are clustered by firm. 
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As shown by Columns (1) and (2), when interacting with R&D, E-
Index has a negative but statistically insignificant time-series association 
with Q, C-Index has a positive and statistically significant time-series 
association with Q, and I-Index has a negative but statistically insignificant 
time-series association with Q. Consistent with our commitment theory of 
bilateral protection arrangements, this seems to suggest that such 
arrangements are considerably more strongly related to changes in firm 
value for firms with more R&D investments. Specifically, a one-point 
increase in C-Index during 1978–2008 is associated with a 4.5% larger 
increase in firm value for firms whose R&D is one standard deviation 
higher than the mean relative to firms whose R&D is at the mean.232 
Our most striking results are those on labor productivity. As shown by 
Columns (3) and (4), the interaction of Labor Productivity with each of the 
three governance indices has a coefficient that is positive and statistically 
significant. Economically, these effects are meaningful. A one-point 
increase in C-Index during 1978–2008 is associated with a 1.8%233 larger 
increase in firm value for firms whose Labor Productivity is a standard 
deviation above the average, relative to firms with average Labor 
Productivity. The economic magnitude of the I-Index interaction is similar. 
This suggests that in firms where employee contributions are relatively 
more important for value creation, committing shareholders to a more 
stable relationship with employees is so relevant that benefits accrue even 
when unilateral provisions are used to protect managers. In other words, in 
these cases the positive effects stemming from incentivizing employee 
firm-specific investments outweigh the detrimental effects generally 
displayed by such provisions in terms of increased managerial moral 
hazard. 
Finally, results on the three governance indices when interacting with 
Large Customer are similar. As shown by Columns (5) and (6), when 
interacting with Large Customer, E-Index has a negative but statistically 
insignificant coefficient, C-Index has a positive and statistically significant 
coefficient, and I-Index has a negative but statistically insignificant 
coefficient. Similar to R&D investments, this suggests that changes to the 
governance provisions included in the C-Index are considerably more 
 
232 The economic significance for the interactions presented in Tables 4 and 5 is calculated as 
follows. First, we multiply the interaction coefficient and the standard deviation of the proxy that is 
interacted with the governance index, and, second, we divide the product by the average firm value in 
our sample. For R&D, that calculation is equal to 1.272 x 0.06 / 1.69 = 4.5%. 
233 The economic significance for the interaction between C-Index and Labor Productivity is 
calculated as follows: 0.044 x 0.7 / 1.69 = 1.8%. 
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strongly related to changes in firm value for firms with a Large Customer. 
Economically, Column (6) shows that a unit increase in C-Index is 
associated with a 2.1%234 larger increase in Q for firms with a large 
customer. In results that we do not report (due to brevity concerns), we also 
find that the larger the percentage of a firm’s sales accounted for by a 
Large Customer, the greater the positive impact of C-Index on firm value 
(meaning that if a firm’s customer accounts for more than 10% of the 
firm’s sales, the impact of C-Index on firm value also increases). 
Overall, these results strongly support the view that the ability of 
bilateral protection arrangements to mitigate the limited commitment 
problem is a primary channel through which these arrangements are 
positively associated with firm value. The adoption of such arrangements is 
indeed more strongly related to increases in firm value in firms where 
ensuring the commitment of shareholders to the longer horizon is more 
relevant—such as (i) firms that are more engaged in innovation, (ii) firms 
with large long-term customers, and (iii) firms with more firm-specific 
labor productivity or where employee commitment is more important for 
value creation.235 
2. Excessive Risk-Taking.—Creditors are often described as the 
most important of the firm’s stakeholders after shareholders, whose 
participation in the corporate enterprise is essential to ensuring a 
corporation’s ability to expand and thrive. This has become increasingly 
the case in the twenty-first century, as radical changes have not only 
occurred in corporate production, but also in capital structures.236 Departing 
from the all-equity (or low-leverage) capital structure of the Berle and 
Means era, today’s corporations exhibit capital structures in which non-
equity investments have grown into a steady source of capital—in fact, 
even a primary source of capital in some industrial sectors.237 
 
234 The economic significance for the interaction between C-Index and Large Customer is 
calculated as follows: 0.0356 x 1 / 1.69 = 2.1%.  
235 Many firms are likely to present such features today, due to firm value having grown 
increasingly dependent on investments in technological know-how and specialized human capital in the 
modern corporation. See Cremers & Sepe, supra note 18, at 120–21. This has been especially so since 
the mid-1990s, with the emergence of the digital revolution, consistent with our hypothesis that the 
importance of bilateral protection arrangements for best governance practices—which began around the 
same time—is best understood as a response to the intensification of the shareholder limited 
commitment problem. See supra text accompanying notes 212–15. 
236 Simone M. Sepe, Intruders in the Boardroom: The Case of Constituency Directors, 91 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 309, 366 (2013).  
237 Id.  
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It is thus unsurprising that creditors, as a group, are regarded by the 
law as “a useful proxy for the wider nonshareholder social interests in firm 
success.”238 Indeed, as fixed claimants, creditors and other stakeholders are 
exposed to the risk of wealth-transferring actions that enrich shareholders 
at their expense.239 The classic wealth-transfer example is excessive risk 
taking, which may penalize various firm stakeholders, but especially 
creditors, given their position as primary providers of non-equity capital.240 
Economically, this problem arises out of the divergent upside and downside 
potential exhibited by creditors versus shareholders. As fixed claimants, 
creditors are largely indifferent to increases in returns from corporate 
assets, while they are highly sensitive to declines in asset value—thus 
preferring safer investment strategies. In contrast, as residual corporate 
claimants, shareholders are highly sensitive to increases in equity returns, 
while the protection of limited liability makes them comparatively less 
sensitive to losses. Once a corporation has outstanding debt, this payoff 
structure induces shareholders—and managers acting on their behalf—to 
prefer riskier over safer projects. Indeed, if things go well, shareholders 
expect to capture most of the upside potential of riskier projects. If things 
turn awry, instead, creditors will bear most losses. 
Once one acknowledges the dangers that arise from the shareholders’ 
risk preferences, which may be transmitted to managers, logic requires one 
to also acknowledge that situating directors and managers at some distance 
from shareholders might be helpful to constrain excessive risk taking. On 
this view, we pose that bilateral protection arrangements may serve as a 
beneficial commitment device through which shareholders bind themselves 
ex ante to limit their future ability to pressure management to undertake 
riskier projects. This would reduce a corporation’s cost of debt, avoiding 
that creditors may raise interest rates in anticipation of future excessive risk 
taking. Empirically, if our interpretation of the relationship between 
bilateral protection arrangements and excessive risk taking is correct, we 
would expect to find that the adoption of such arrangements is more 
 
238 Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1907, 
1929 (2013). 
239 See Sepe, supra note 236, at 319–20. 
240 In addition to excessive risk-taking (or “asset substitution” or “overinvestment”), other actions 
that may illegitimately transfer wealth from debtholders to stockholders include the payment of 
excessively large dividends, the issuance of additional debt, and the rejection of projects with a positive 
net present value when the benefits from such projects accrue solely to the debtholders. The classic 
reference on shareholder opportunism toward fixed claimants is Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Jerold B. 
Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117, 118–19 
(1979). 
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strongly related to increases in firm value in firms that are more exposed to 
the likelihood of future excessive risk taking. 
To test our hypothesis, we employ a widely used proxy for bankruptcy 
risk, Z-Score.241 By construction, a higher Z-Score indicates a firm with low 
bankruptcy risk, while a lower Z-Score indicates a firm with more 
bankruptcy risk.242 In running Z-Score regressions (i.e., where Z-Score 
rather than Q is the dependent variable), which we do not report here to 
save space,243 we find that a higher C-Index score is associated with a 
higher Z-Score (i.e., less bankruptcy risk). Conversely, a higher I-Index 
score, as well as a higher E-Index score, are associated with a lower Z-
Score (i.e., more bankruptcy risk). 
These results show that the adoption of bilateral protection 
arrangements benefit creditors by reducing a debtor’s risk of default, 
consistent with our theory that such arrangements strengthen a firm’s long-
term relationship with the various stakeholders. Conversely, unilateral 
protection arrangements are detrimental to creditors, as they increase a 
debtor’s risk of default. This also seems consistent with our interpretation 
of unilateral protection arrangements. Indeed, when managerial protection 
from removal is implemented without explicit shareholder agreement, it is, 
in general, more likely to have the exclusive purpose of advancing manager 
self-interest at the expense not only of shareholders, but also creditors.244 
 
241 Data for Z-Score is from Compustat. 
242 Specifically, firms with a high Z-Score are firms with more liquid assets, higher historical and 
current profitability, better growth opportunities or market valuations of current assets, and higher asset 
turnover (and vice versa for firms with a low Z-Score). The Z-Score is calculated as follows: Z = 1.2 x 
T1 + 1.4 x T2 + 3.3 x T3 + 0.6 x T4 + 0.99 x T5. Edward I. Altman, Financial Ratios, Discriminant 
Analysis, and the Prediction of Corporate Bankruptcy, 23 J. FIN. 589, 594 (1968). Here, T1 = Working 
Capital / Total Assets, a measure of the liquid assets in relation to the size of the company; T2 = 
Retained Earnings / Total Assets, a measure of profitability that reflects the company’s historical 
earning power; T3 = Earnings Before Interest and Taxes / Total Assets, a measure of current operating 
efficiency apart from tax and leveraging factors; T4 = Market Value of Equity / Book Value of Total 
Liabilities, a proxy of the market’s perception of the efficient use of the firm’s assets; T5 = Sales / Total 
Assets, a measure of total asset turnover. Id. 
243 We report these results in Appendix Table D.  
244 In the case of golden parachutes, the detrimental effect that such provisions produce on creditors 
is rather straightforward. Indeed, the substantial payment that a golden parachute may trigger in favor of 
managers upon a change in control can be regarded as a form of claim dilution, which reduces the 
expected future cash flows on which creditors can count for the repayment of debt. See Smith & 
Warner, supra note 240, at 118. On the other hand, having a visible pill (rather than only a “shadow 
pill”) suggests that management is particularly set against any acquisition attempts from outsiders, 
regardless of whether that attempt constitutes a threat to a firm’s commitment to the long-term horizon 
or a value-increasing replacement of underperforming management. Thus, firms with a visible pill may 
also be more apt to employ additional leverage as a second line of defense against a potential takeover, 
as adding leverage increases a bidder’s prospective costs. Sudip Datta & Mai Iskandar-Datta, Takeover 
Defenses and Wealth Effects on Securityholders: The Case of Poison Pill Adoptions, 20 J. BANKING & 
FIN. 1231, 1232–33 (1996). Alternatively, if a bidder is able to acquire the target (i.e., by having the pill 
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Z-Score regressions, however, are not informative of the relation 
between a firm’s risk exposure and firm value (i.e., shareholder value). 
However, our conjecture is that a lower level of risk (i.e., a higher Z-
Score), as promoted by the adoption of bilateral protection arrangements, 
should result in higher firm value in the long term, benefiting creditors and 
shareholders alike. In order to verify whether the association between firm 
value and risk taking is influenced by specific governance arrangements, 
we run Q regressions on the governance indices interacted with Z-Score. 
Table 5 below shows our results. 
  
 
removed), the financing of the takeover generally leads to additional leverage as well (especially if the 
change of control is implemented through a leveraged buyout). See id. In both cases, the claim of 
existing creditors to corporate assets emerges as diluted by the addition of new, unanticipated debt, 
increasing the risk to which existing creditors are exposed. 
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TABLE 5: FIRM VALUE, BANKRUPTCY RISK, AND GOVERNANCE INDICES 
Dependent Variable: Q 
 (1) (2) 
Index Variables  
E-Index 0.00171  
 (0.10)  
E-Index ൈ Z-Score -0.00327  
 
(-0.81) 
 
C-Index  -0.00236 
  (-0.08) 
C-Index ൈ Z-Score  0.0116 
  (1.51) 
I-Index  0.0142 
  (0.64) 
I-Index ൈ Z-Score  -0.0132** 
  (-2.37) 
Z-Score 0.101*** 0.0985*** 
 (9.35) (9.01) 
Fixed Effects:                                                              Year + Firm 
              N 18,939 18,939 
              R-sq 0.725 0.726 
† In this Table, we present the time-series association between firm value and Z-Score, a proxy of bankruptcy 
risk, as interacted with three governance indices (the E-Index, C-Index, and I-Index) using pooled panel Q 
regressions with year and firm fixed effects plus a set of controls: CAPX, R&D, and Industry M&A Volume.245 
All columns use the full time period 1978–2008. Coefficients on standard controls are not shown to save space. 
Variables are defined in Appendix Table A. Statistical significance of the coefficients is indicated at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels by ***, **, and *, respectively. We provide the t-statistics below each regression coefficient based 
on robust standard errors that are clustered by firm. 
Consistent with our conjecture, Table 5 shows that a higher Z-Score 
has a positive coefficient equal to 0.101 (with a t-statistic of 9.35). This 
suggests that firms with a Z-Score that is a standard deviation higher than 
the mean experience a 14.6% higher firm value relative to firms with a Z-
 
245 In Table 5, we do not control for Assets and ROA, as these variables capture similar firm 
characteristics as those embedded in Z-Score. If we add Assets and ROA as controls to Column (2), the 
coefficient and t-statistic for the interaction of Z-Score and C-Index remain unchanged, but the 
coefficient of the interactions of Z-Score and I-Index goes down to -0.0072 with a t-statistic of 1.37, 
indicating lower statistical significance with an associated p-value of 17% (i.e., above typical levels of 
statistical significance used in the literature). 
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Score that is at the mean.246 Combined with the results we obtain in Z-Score 
regressions—that increases in C-Index are associated with increases in Z-
Score, strengthening firm stability and thus creditor prospects—this result 
supports the view that bilateral protection arrangements benefit both 
creditors and shareholders. 
This interpretation of the relationship between governance 
arrangements, risk, and firm value is further supported by the results we 
obtain for the Q regressions on C-Index when interacting with Z-Score. As 
shown by Column (2), the interaction coefficient is positive and equal to 
0.0116,247 implying that a one-point increase in C-Index is associated with a 
1.7% larger increase in firm value for firms with a high Z-Score relative to 
firms with a low Z-Score.248 This suggests that bilateral protection 
arrangements are more strongly associated with increases in firm value in 
firms that currently have a relatively low bankruptcy risk and hence may 
have more potential to engage in future excessive risk (as their level of risk 
is not excessive already). 
In contrast to the coefficient of C-Index, the coefficient of I-Index is 
negative and statistically significant, equal to -0.0132 (shown in Column 
(2)). This suggests that a one-point increase in I-Index is associated with a 
1.9% larger decrease in firm value for firms with a high Z-Score relative to 
firms with a low Z-Score.249 The adoption of the provisions included in the 
I-Index thus seems more detrimental to firms that are more likely to engage 
in future excessive risk. This is consistent with our interpretation that 
unilateral protection arrangements are likely to have, in general, an 
opportunistic motivation, to the detriment of both shareholder and creditor 
interests. 
 
246 We calculate the economic significance as follows: We multiply the coefficient of 0.101 for Z-
Score by the standard deviation of Z-Score (2.44), and divide the result by the average Q in the sample 
(1.69). 
247 The statistical significance of the interaction of Z-Score and C-Index has a t-statistic of 1.51, 
which has an associated p-value of 13%. This means that it is just above the typical level of marginal 
statistical significance used in the literature, but in our interpretation it suggests that the interaction is 
relevant, though should warrant a more cautious interpretation than coefficients that are strongly 
statistically significant. 
248 We calculate the economic magnitude of the effect as follows: We multiply the coefficient of 
0.0116 by the standard deviation of Z-Score (2.44), and divide by the average Q in the sample (1.69). 
As a result, the difference between “high” and “low” Z-Score here is assumed to be one sample 
standard deviation in Z-Score, equal to 2.44. 
249 Similar to C-Index, also here we multiply the coefficient of -0.0132 by the standard deviation of 
Z-Score (2.44), and divide by the average Q in the sample (1.69). As a result, the difference between 
“high” and “low” Z-Score here is assumed to be one sample standard deviation in Z-Score, equal to 
2.44. 
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IV. BOARD AUTHORITY, MANAGERIAL ACCOUNTABILITY, AND 
STAKEHOLDER INTERESTS 
Our analysis of the E-Index challenges the view that reducing 
entrenchment is what matters the most in corporate governance—
suggesting that promoting a firm’s commitment to the long term matters as 
well, and potentially much more. The implications of this analysis are 
significant for debates concerning both the means and ends of corporate 
governance. Theoretically, it shows that when the shareholder wealth 
maximization mandate is rightly understood as focusing on the long-term 
horizon,250 the republican version of the board-centric model emerges as 
better suited to pursue that mandate than a direct shareholder democracy 
model. By protecting directors from short-term removal with the ex ante 
agreement of shareholders, the former model preserves a board’s ability to 
put in place a commitment to the long term—which shareholders 
themselves are unable to provide due to their limited commitment 
problem.251 Empirically, this conclusion is corroborated by the evidence 
that the republican corporate model is strongly associated with increases in 
long-term firm value, especially in firms where the limited commitment 
problem is likely to be more significant.252 
Our account of corporate governance, however, has still not addressed 
the major criticism raised by shareholder advocates against the board-
centric model: that enhanced board authority necessarily comes at the 
expense of reduced managerial accountability. Because under that model 
directors and managers are removed (even if only temporarily so) from the 
judgment of shareholders, it is argued that there no longer is a mechanism 
through which they are held accountable for their actions—with the result 
that in the end the only wealth that is maximized is that of directors and 
managers themselves.253 The clearest implication of this account of board 
authority concerns the consideration of stakeholder interests. When 
 
250 See supra Section II.A.2. 
251 See supra text accompanying notes 118–20. 
252 See supra Parts II–III. Of course, changes in the six constituent provisions in the E-Index are 
endogenous, and partly under the firm’s control. As typical of corporate governance studies, we do not 
have clear exogenous variation in firm-level changes to these provisions. Rather, our identification is 
indirect and comes from two sources. First, our alternative account of what really matters in corporate 
governance predicts the opposite sign (i.e., positive rather than negative) for the association with firm 
value of bilateral protection arrangements as compared to unilateral arrangements. Second, our 
alternative governance account identifies firms where the limited commitment problem is more severe 
as those where bilateral protection arrangements are likely to be more positively associated with firm 
value. In our empirical work, we test these two sets of predictions and find strong support for both in 
the data. 
253 See Bainbridge, supra note 60, at 565–66 (summarizing this argument).  
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directors and managers are empowered to consider such interests, so the 
argument goes, they can more easily camouflage opportunities for 
managerial moral hazard as being beneficial to stakeholders, at the expense 
of corporate profitability.254 
Yet, this Article’s evidence that the republican board-centric model is 
strongly associated with increased firm value suggests that something is 
missing in current analyses of the relationships among board authority, 
managerial accountability, and stakeholder interests. In this Part, we draw 
on the economic theory of soft and hard budget constraints to demystify 
those relationships and their intertemporal dynamics, and explain how 
criticism of the board-centric model has been misdirected due to the wrong 
assumption that board authority and accountability are antithetical. 
A. Soft and Hard Budget Constraints 
The criticism that a board-centric model lacks managerial 
accountability can be framed as a “soft budget constraint” problem. 
Originally formulated by economist János Kornai,255 the term soft budget 
constraint is used to describe an economic environment in which the 
occurrence of “failure”—poor performance as benchmarked against 
objective metrics, such as those captured by prices—triggers inefficient 
support rather than “punishment” (for example through the liquidation of 
the failing entity).256 The classic example is that of firms in planned 
economies.257 Conversely, economists refer to a “hard budget constraint” 
when failure leads to efficient ex post settling up, as generally happens in 
the context of market economies.258 
The intuition for why a market framework is more likely to hold to a 
hard budget constraint—and then to offer better accountability 
mechanisms—is that decentralized decisionmaking mitigates the likelihood 
that private interests may lead to rescue in cases where it would be efficient 
to reduce or cease an activity. In contrast, when the decision process is 
centralized, such as in planned economies or within the boundaries of the 
firm, decisionmakers are more likely to exhibit private interests that 
 
254 See id. at 581. 
255 See J. Kornai, Resource-Constrained Versus Demand-Constrained Systems, 47 ECONOMETRICA 
801, 801 (1979). 
256 See id. at 806–08; János Kornai et al., Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint, 41 J. ECON. 
LITERATURE 1095, 1097 (2003).  
257 See Kornai et al., supra note 256, at 1096.  
258 See Kornai, supra note 255, at 806–08. 
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motivate them to “meddle” with failure.259 Decentralization thus provides a 
better remedy against the risk of an agent’s moral hazard by making it more 
credible that the decisionmaker will hold to a hard budget constraint. When 
an agent expect failure to be punished ex post by the decisionmaker, with 
punishment being costly to the agent, she will have stronger incentives to 
expend costly effort. On the contrary, when the agent expect failure to be 
tolerated by the decisionmaker, the agent’s incentives for effort are 
weakened, as expending effort may be more costly to the agent than the 
consequences of failure.260 
It is then easy to see why the soft budget constraint literature seems to 
support the desirability of a direct democracy model of the corporation with 
stronger shareholder rights (i.e., market discipline). When authority is 
vested in financial markets, rather than the board, the firm’s budget 
constraint naturally hardens. This is because markets can more credibly 
commit to punish low firm outcomes than directors, whose incentives may 
deviate according to their private interest in compensation and job 
retention. 
Yet, as straightforward as this account of corporate relationships may 
appear, it oversimplifies the conceptual apparatus of the soft–hard budget 
constraint. It does so by downplaying the risk that informational 
inefficiencies and other market imperfections may make performance 
benchmarks potentially inaccurate. As discussed earlier, with discontinuous 
prices, the market may be unable to fully capture fundamental values in the 
short horizon261 and, therefore, to accurately gauge whether “failure” has 
occurred. In this case, holding the corporation to a hard budget constraint 
may lead to undesirable effects,262 as shareholders may end up punishing 
corporate insiders in the short term when efficiency would require them to 
commit to the long term. 
Within this analytical framework, neither a pure hard budget 
constraint model of the corporation (i.e., a shareholder democracy) nor a 
pure soft budget constraint model (i.e., unilateral incumbent protection) is 
 
259 See Kornai et al., supra note 256, at 1098–100. 
260 See M. Dewatripont & E. Maskin, Credit and Efficiency in Centralized and Decentralized 
Economies, 62 REV. ECON. STUD. 541, 541–42 (1995) (formalizing the soft budget constraint problem 
as a financial commitment problem).  
261 See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
262 Economists Mathias Dewatripont and Eric Maskin formally showed that the disciplinary effects 
of a decentralized credit model (i.e., a hard budget constraint) may foster an overemphasis on short-
term results if the realization of the firm’s project only occurs in the long term and, at the interim stage, 
good projects are hardly distinguishable from bad projects. See Dewatripont & Maskin, supra note 260, 
at 542. 
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desirable, as they both provide corner solutions.263 The former model 
minimizes moral hazard at the expense of the distortions arising from the 
limited commitment problem, and vice versa. Optimal corporate 
governance should instead provide an “interior solution”264 (or a “hybrid”), 
which holds the corporation to a soft budget constraint in the short term, 
mitigating the distortions arising from the limited commitment problem, 
and a hard budget constraint in the long term, reducing the risk of 
managerial moral hazard. A republican corporate model is the governance 
system that better approximates this interior solution. 
On the one hand, unlike the shareholder democracy model, the 
republican model grants directors the ability “to soften the budget 
constraint” in the short term through the adoption of bilateral protection 
arrangements. More specifically, by short term, we refer to the beginning 
of a director’s tenure, when it is more likely that directors may have an 
informational advantage over financial markets and, hence, that prices may 
fail to fully reflect the implications of a given investment policy. Under 
these circumstances, the ability “to soften the budget” empowers directors 
to take actions that tolerate what may appear to the market as “early 
failure” (e.g., low short-term earnings), when short-term tolerance is 
required to foster innovation and other long-term projects, as well as to 
promote stronger stakeholder relationships.265 
On the other hand, the republican model departs from the dictatorial 
model that shareholder advocates seem to have in mind when criticizing 
any form of directorial protection from removal. In contrast to this account, 
protecting directors from removal does not emerge as antithetical to board 
accountability, as long as it is the result of the mutual agreement of the 
board and shareholders (or, if board protection from removal has a 
unilateral nature, it is limited in time). Indeed, only by assuming that 
directors and managers who experience chronic losses are punished rather 
than rescued—thus being held to a hard, rather than soft, budget constraint 
in the long term—can one explain the positive association we document 
between adopting bilateral protection arrangements and increases in firm 
value over time.266 
 
263 See MICHAEL CARTER, FOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS 502 (2001) (defining a 
“boundary,” i.e., “corner,” solution as the one that “lies on the boundary of the feasible set” of solutions 
to an optimization problem).  
264 See id.  
265 Cf. Gustavo Manso, Motivating Innovation, 66 J. FIN. 1823, 1824 (2011) (defending 
compensation schemes that exhibit more “tolerance” for early failure and reward long-term 
performance as efficient).  
266 See supra Tables 2 & 3. 
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This suggests that the republican model of the corporation does not 
jeopardize market-based accountability mechanisms, but rather ensures that 
those mechanisms operate in the time frame in which they are more likely 
to be effective. As time progresses and a director’s tenure matures, the 
implications of directorial decisions begin to show up in cash flows. As a 
result, market prices become more likely to incorporate the real value of 
past corporate policies and convey accurate information on how well or 
poorly directors manage a firm. Viewed through this lens, bilateral 
protection arrangements ensure that shareholders hold incumbents 
accountable in the long term, when the former are likely to be better 
positioned to evaluate directorial and managerial actions. 
For example, in spite of the oft-repeated remark by shareholder 
advocates that a staggered board insulates directors from market discipline, 
the usual three-year term served by directors in a staggered board does not 
permanently remove them from the judgment of the market. Instead, that 
longer term provides a time frame for directorial evaluation by the 
shareholders that is less likely to be biased by informational inefficiency. 
Similarly, supermajority requirements to amend the charter and approve 
mergers do not reduce long-term directorial accountability, but 
constructively strengthen board authority in the short term. The logic is the 
same as the logic that underlies proposals—advanced by shareholder 
advocates—that managers should be compensated for good performance 
only after a time frame that allows for adequate evaluation of their 
actions.267 In the same way, managers should be punished, if that is 
appropriate, only after sufficient time has passed to gauge the full 
implications of their allegedly bad actions. 
B. Demystifying the Stakeholder Interests Problem 
Viewing the republican corporate model as a unique organizational 
solution that holds directors to a soft budget constraint in the short term and 
a hard budget constraint in the long term demystifies much of the criticism 
levied against the consideration of stakeholder interests in corporate 
governance. One classic criticism is that consideration of such interests is 
 
267 See, e.g., BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 54, at 191 (arguing for limits on managers’ “freedom to 
unwind the equity-based incentives created by their compensation plans”). As Delaware Supreme Court 
Chief Justice Leo E. Strine, Jr. remarked, this position seems difficult to reconcile with “Bebchuk’s 
career-long obsession” for shareholder democracy, sounding like an admission on Bebchuk’s “part that 
increasing demands on corporations to manage to immediate stock market pressures might not be good 
for stockholders or society generally.” Strine, supra note 111, at 467.  
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designed to pursue social goals unrelated to corporate profitability.268 On 
this view, the board’s commitment to stronger shareholder relationships 
would come at the expense of shareholder profits, empowering directors 
with the ability to reallocate wealth from shareholders to stakeholders. This 
view of shareholder–stakeholder relationships, however, is lacking both 
empirically and theoretically. 
Empirically, we have shown that protecting board authority to secure a 
firm’s commitment to long-term stakeholder relationships seems to benefit 
stakeholders and shareholders alike, especially in firms where specific 
stakeholder investments are likely to matter the most. The remarkable 
economic success of the management corporation is also consistent with 
our empirical results. As discussed earlier, bilateral protection 
arrangements seem to have emerged as a corrective to the erosion of board 
authority brought about by the rise of shareholder power.269 Accordingly, if 
the above criticism of shareholder advocates was correct, shareholders 
should be better off today than they have historically been under the 
management corporation model, for that model granted directors discretion 
to consider a wide range of corporate interests, as long as it was 
instrumental to promote corporate growth.270 Instead, the management 
corporation “generated wealth in a stable, steep-curved way”271 during the 
so-called golden age of American capitalism.272 
Theoretically, the above criticism both underestimates the value to 
shareholders of securing optimal stakeholder investments and erroneously 
seems to treat shareholder wealth maximization as an end in itself. As a 
result of the radical changes that have occurred in both corporate 
production and capital structures, promoting firm-specific stakeholder 
investments—such as investments by specialized employees or long-term 
relationships with creditors or large customers—has become increasingly 
essential to the pursuit of corporate profitability.273 Further, short-term 
 
268 See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 60, at 549 (summarizing this argument).  
269 See supra text accompanying notes 212–15. 
270 See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text.  
271 Jacobs, supra note 60, at 1646. 
272 One study reports that from 1933 until 1976, i.e., roughly speaking, the era of managerial 
capitalism, the total real compound annual return on the stocks of the S&P 500 was 7.6%. Roger 
Martin, The Age of Customer Capitalism, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 2010, at 58, 60, 
https://hbr.org/2010/01/the-age-of-customer-capitalism [http://perma.cc/8D8F-QSUE]. From 1976 until 
2011, during which period board authority was increasingly weakened by empowered shareholders, the 
comparable return has been 5.9%. Id. 
273 See supra note 235. A concrete example is offered by the value that the outstanding skills of 
Google engineers deliver to the company. This might explain why “Googlers” enjoy an extremely high 
level of perks—including, among others, free food and shuttle services, travel insurance, on-site 
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transfers of wealth from shareholders to stakeholders may be instrumental 
in increasing long-term shareholder and firm value in the context of asset 
pricing inefficiency. Indeed, with discontinuous market prices, directors are 
likely to have superior information regarding whether a course of action 
deviating from short-term shareholder wealth maximization will enhance 
long-term firm value. Hence, as long as a transfer of wealth from 
shareholders to stakeholders is going to pay off in the long run, such a 
transfer should be deemed beneficial, rather than detrimental, to 
shareholder interests.274 
Another classic criticism raised against the consideration of 
stakeholder interests in corporate governance is that it would exacerbate 
managerial moral hazard, necessarily leading to abandonment of the goal of 
shareholder wealth maximization and, hence, to indeterminate results.275 As 
we have shown, however, the bilateral model does not discard the 
shareholder wealth maximization mandate; rather it ensures that such a 
mandate efficiently operates in the long term. In practice, this means that 
while directors and managers are free to assess the intertemporal tradeoffs 
that must be made among competing corporate constituencies—exploiting 
their informational advantage on the long-term value to shareholders of 
 
physicians and nurses, generous maternity or paternity leaves, low-cost legal advice, and death benefits. 
Google Careers: Benefits, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/about/careers/lifeatgoogle/benefits/ 
[https://perma.cc/L66M-TJDQ]. Whereas the classic account of stakeholder–shareholder relationships 
portrays the improvement of employees’ social conditions as necessarily antithetical to shareholder 
profits, the Google example speaks to the contrary. Google’s perks might raise expenses to Google’s 
shareholders. Yet, they are likely to deliver them benefits that largely outweigh those expenses by 
helping to retain key employees and—as stated on the company’s website—by removing barriers that 
could prevent Googlers from optimally focusing on their work. See id. 
274 Consider the classic example of directors faced with the decision of whether to close an 
obsolete plant. In the standard narrative, this example is used to illustrate the inefficiency to which 
allowing directors to consider stakeholder interests may lead. Increased directorial discretion—so the 
argument goes—enhances directors’ ability to camouflage their own interests as concern for 
stakeholder interests, making it easier for the directors to keep the plant open even when it would be 
efficient to close it. See Bainbridge, supra note 60, at 581–82. Yet, this narrative takes for granted that 
any attempt to rescue the plant is value destroying, while also assuming that it is public information. In 
actuality, however, directors are likely to have competitive private information on the future value of an 
apparently obsolete plant, as well as on the gains to be made by strengthening a firm’s commitment to 
nonshareholder constituencies, such as local communities. Allowing directors to take actions that 
account for similar intertemporal tradeoffs will benefit shareholders and stakeholders alike in the long 
term. Yet, a shareholder advocate could argue that a relaxation of directors’ focus on shareholder wealth 
maximization might allow them to justify a decision to keep the plant open even when there are no 
future gains to be made. This argument, however, can only be sustained if one assumes a static context 
(i.e., a one-shot game), in which allowing directors to deviate from the shareholder wealth 
maximization mandate in the short term is equivalent to abandoning that mandate altogether. However, 
in a dynamic context, in which directors are held accountable for the decision to keep the plant open 
based on long-term outcomes and share value, they are unlikely to do so unless they expect substantial 
future gains from this course of action. 
275 See id. at 581 (referring to this criticism as the “two masters problem”). 
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stakeholder participation—they remain accountable for those tradeoffs 
against the benchmark of long-term shareholder value. This mitigates the 
risk that directors and managers may opportunistically exploit stakeholder 
interests to pursue their personal interests, as the possibility of long-term 
shareholder retribution continues to ensure the existence of effective 
accountability mechanisms.276 
V. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
The conclusion of our analysis of the relationship between corporate 
governance and firm value is that protection of incumbents from removal 
benefits shareholder and societal interests as long as it is the result of the 
mutual agreement of the board and the shareholders (or, if the protection 
has a unilateral nature, it is limited in time). It does so by committing 
shareholders to preservation of a board’s ability to optimally pursue long-
term value maximization strategies, without jeopardizing board exposure to 
shareholder discipline in the longer term. This conclusion not only is at 
odds with the findings of the literature on governance indices. It also has 
fundamental implications both for the providers of commercial governance 
indices and for regulators, which have largely adhered to the misguided 
proposition that stronger shareholder rights are an all-purpose remedy in 
corporate governance. 
 
276 Our account of the relationship between board authority, stakeholder interests, and managerial 
accountability also helps bridge the gap between the two of the most prominent board-centric models of 
the corporation—the “team production model,” developed by Professors Margaret Blair and Lynn 
Stout, and the “director primacy model,” developed by Professor Steven Bainbridge. See Blair & Stout, 
supra note 60; Bainbridge, supra note 60. For Blair and Stout, protecting board authority vis-à-vis 
shareholders is instrumental to promote optimal firm-specific investments by all the corporate 
participants, avoiding that shareholders might use their corporate power to opportunistically expropriate 
other stakeholders. See Blair & Stout, supra, at 251–54. They accordingly argue that directors are 
charged with maximizing the joint welfare of all constituents who make firm-specific investments. See 
id. For Bainbridge, instead, board authority is the response to shareholders’ informational and collective 
action problems, but needs to exclusively focus on the end of maximizing shareholder value. See 
Bainbridge, supra, at 557–59, 574. The alleged differences between these models, however, are much 
reduced when one conceives of enhanced board authority as a response to the limited commitment 
problem and the distortions arising from a static approach to shareholder wealth maximization. On the 
one hand, our theoretical framework reconceptualizes suboptimal stakeholder investments as a major 
cost arising from the inability of shareholders with strong exit rights to commit to not predating the 
board’s informational advantage over time—reconciling the theoretical foundations of the two models. 
On the other hand, it rationalizes short-term transfers of wealth from shareholders to stakeholders as a 
means to maximize long-term shareholder and firm value—also reconciling the team production model 
and the director primacy model along the end axis of corporate governance. 
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A. Are Commercial Indices Reliable? 
As discussed, proxy advisors’ indices share the basic assumption of 
academic governance indices like the G-Index and the E-Index, namely that 
stronger shareholder rights unequivocally equate to best governance 
practices.277 From a theoretical perspective, then, commercial indices are 
exposed to criticisms analogous to those affecting academic indices. 
However, the former bear much more significant practical implications, 
given the direct, and huge, influence they exert on corporate practices at 
many U.S. corporations, as well as on the corporate governance strategies 
of most American institutional investors. 
Under our analysis of corporate governance, the strong emphasis 
placed by proxy advisors on shareholder rights emerges as pushing U.S. 
corporations in directions that are likely to be counterproductive, and, 
potentially, accountable for the increased short-termism observed in U.S. 
markets. This result is even more problematic if one considers the conflicts 
of interests that may affect the actions of proxy advisors. Our concern 
arises by a simple consideration. The case for stronger shareholder rights 
inherently promotes shareholder empowerment and thus increased 
shareholder activism, resulting in more intense voting advisory activity and 
hence increased revenues for proxy advisors.278 Therefore, while 
shareholder empowerment may or may not benefit shareholder and societal 
 
277 See supra text accompanying notes 90–98.  
278 A further concern is posed by the additional role that several proxy firms perform as governance 
advisors. This dual role raises the concern that these firms’ voting recommendations to investors may 
be influenced by whether or not the subject company has also purchased any governance advice from 
such firms. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-07-765, CORPORATE SHAREHOLDER 
MEETINGS: ISSUES RELATING TO FIRMS THAT ADVISE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS ON PROXY VOTING 4 
(2007) (arguing that the dual role served by proxy advisors as investors and companies’ consultants 
could “lead corporations to feel obligated to retain ISS’s consulting services in order to obtain favorable 
proxy vote recommendations”); Rose, supra note 90, at 906–07 (comparing the potential conflict 
affecting proxy advisors to the conflict affecting accounting firms that acted as both auditors and 
advisers before the Sarbanes–Oxley reform). ISS has historically dismissed similar concerns arguing 
that it discloses information about potential conflicts, while its proxy advisory and corporate consulting 
businesses operate through a system of “Chinese walls,” with separate staff, separate buildings, and 
segregated office equipment and information databases. E.g., Gary Retelny, President, Institutional 
Shareholder Servs., Inc., U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Proxy Advisory Firms Roundtable 
110–11 (Dec. 5, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/proxy-advisory-services/proxy-advisory-services-
transcript.txt [http://perma.cc/LQ27-BZPV]. Nonetheless, in June 2014, the SEC’s Divisions of 
Investment Management and Corporation Finance issued new regulatory guidelines concerning the 
activity of proxy advisors. Among other issues, the new SEC guidelines require specific, nongeneric 
disclosure to be made of the nature and scope of significant relationships or material interests in the 
matter that is the subject of a voting recommendation (either publicly or directly to the client), while 
rejecting the practice of “boilerplate language” about potential conflicts as insufficient. SEC Staff Legal 
Bulletin No. 20 (June 30, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/cfslb20.htm [http://perma.cc/9NJM-
KDYE]. 
110-4 CREMERS-MASCONALE-SEPE MASTER COPY II (CLEAN).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/24/2016 2:41 PM 
110:727 (2016) Commitment and Entrenchment in Corporate Governance 
797 
interest in the long term, it definitely advances the private interests of proxy 
advisors.279 
The potential for this conflict raises the question of why investors 
continue to rely on indices that have the potential to push corporations 
toward bad, rather than good, corporate governance. Simply concluding 
that proxy advisors have manipulated the investors purchasing their 
services does not seem plausible, given the sophisticated nature of all 
involved parties.280 Three alternative explanations seem more plausible. 
First, second-guessing the voting recommendations of proxy advisors, as 
well as the construction of commercial indices, would require investors to 
turn into governance specialists, which seems incompatible with a cost-
effective division of corporate roles, even among sophisticated parties. 
Second, the intellectual support provided by academic governance indices 
to the use of commercial governance indices might have reinforced 
investors’ belief that there was, after all, no urgent need to second-guess 
the recommendations of proxy advisors. When one considers the additional 
endorsement that the case for stronger shareholder rights has received by 
recent regulatory reforms,281 that need becomes even less urgent. Third, at 
least as concerns hedge funds and some institutional investors, one cannot 
exclude that these corporate actors may have had their own reasons to 
endorse voting recommendations that supported enhanced shareholder 
power and, hence, facilitated the exercise of short-term speculative 
options.282 
For all the above reasons, the fact that firms selling governance ratings 
are commercially successful cannot be interpreted as evidence that 
governance ratings are unequivocally useful to investors. On the contrary, 
the results of our study raise severe challenges for investors’ use of 
commercial governance indices, calling into question the indices’ main 
proposition—that stronger shareholder rights are an all-purpose remedy in 
corporate governance. In response, a shareholder advocate could argue that 
we produce no direct evidence on the association between commercial 
 
279 We are not the first to acknowledge similar concerns. Former SEC Commissioner Daniel 
Gallagher has voiced similar concerns in several speeches and commentaries. See, e.g., Daniel M. 
Gallagher, Outsized Power & Influence: The Role of Proxy Advisers, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. 
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Sept. 5, 2014), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/09/05/outsized-power-
influence-the-role-of-proxy-advisers [http://perma.cc/74NL-HXAR] (arguing that a central problem 
with investment advisers is making sure that they vote in the investor’s best interest rather than their 
own). 
280 See Bhagat et al., supra note 14, at 1859. 
281 See infra Section V.B.  
282 See supra notes 108–12 and accompanying text. 
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governance indices and firm value and, hence, cannot derive implications 
on the reliability of such indices in identifying good governance practices. 
Yet this position seems to overlook the following three facts. First, the 
index adopted by the second most widely used proxy advisory firm, Glass, 
Lewis & Company, almost exactly replicates the E-Index.283 Second, while 
the ISS’s Corporate Governance Quotient notably includes many variables 
that are not captured by the E-Index (or other academic indices),284 the ISS 
notably opposes governance arrangements that protect directors from 
shareholder removal285 or otherwise weakens shareholder rights.286 Third, 
other recent empirical studies support the conclusion that commercial 
governance indices are not reliable predictors of good governance 
practices287 and may even “have the unintended economic consequence that 
boards of directors are induced to make choices that decrease shareholder 
value.”288 
Hence, the possibility that self-interest might explain the uniform 
defense of stronger shareholder rights by proxy advisors cannot be easily 
dismissed. Instead, action by the SEC would be desirable to exclude with 
certainty that proxy advisors—among the most influential corporate 
players—are acting to primarily advance their own interests, rather than 
that of the investors for which they serve as fiduciaries. To this end, we 
share the call for an intervention of the SEC to require proxy advisory firms 
to disclose the proprietary, quantitative algorithms they use in the 
construction of commercial indices.289 Of course, it might be that these 
 
283 See supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text. 
284 See Daines et al., supra note 92, at 442. 
285 See ISS, 2014 U.S. PROXY VOTING SUMMARY GUIDELINES 10 (2013) [hereinafter ISS 
GUIDELINES], http://www.issgovernance.com/file/files/2014ISSUSSummaryGuidelines.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/56U4-9QUY].  
286 See id. at 23–28. 
287 E.g., Daines et al., supra note 92, at 460 (concluding that commercial indices “have either 
limited or no success in predicting firm performance or other outcomes of interest to shareholders”). 
288 David F. Larcker et al., Outsourcing Shareholder Voting to Proxy Advisory Firms, 58 J.L. & 
ECON. 173, 203 (2015) (examining the consequences of proxy advisory firms’ recommendations during 
the 2011 proxy season and finding a negative stock market reaction to compensation changes adopted 
under such recommendations). 
289 See, e.g., Petition Letter from Edward S. Knight, Exec. Vice President, Gen. Counsel, & Chief 
Regulatory Officer, NASDAQ OMX Grp., Inc., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n, 7 (Oct. 8, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2013/petn4-666.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/74DF-XPSD] (urging public disclosure of proxy advisors’ proprietary information); 
CTR. ON EXEC. COMP., A CALL FOR CHANGE IN THE PROXY ADVISORY INDUSTRY STATUS QUO: THE 
CASE FOR GREATER ACCOUNTABILITY AND OVERSIGHT 55 (2011), 
http://www.execcomp.org/docs/c11-07a%20Proxy%20Advisory%20White%20Paper%20_FULL%
20COLOR_.pdf [http://perma.cc/68FR-E6JH] (pointing to the “general lack of transparency in many of 
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algorithms can better capture the relationship between governance choices 
and firm performance than our study—for example, because they are 
constructed to more accurately account for market trends or because they 
can rely on more comprehensive data sources.290 Nevertheless, our study—
covering thirty years of corporate governance choices—strengthens the 
case for requiring that the proprietary information of proxy advisors be 
made available to the SEC. More generally, our analysis also raises the 
question of whether governance ratings should be administered by a public 
or nonprofit independent agency.291 This solution would have the benefit of 
minimizing the risk of potential conflict of interests. To be sure, more 
extensive investigation into the feasibility and the costs of such a proposal 
would be necessary, but a discussion of the potential for public governance 
ratings seems worthwhile to pursue under the challenges this Article has 
raised for commercial governance indices. 
B. The Shareholder Direction of Federal Regulation 
A further important implication of our analysis involves the 
appropriate form of governance regulation. Recently, the view that 
shareholder empowerment embodies that form has made substantial gains. 
Among others, these gains have included (1) the introduction of 
amendments to proxy filing requirements facilitating the use of shareholder 
precatory proposals;292 (2) changes to the Delaware General Corporation 
Law enabling majority voting in the election of directors,293 as well as 
greater shareholder access to the ballot box;294 and (3) the Dodd–Frank 
 
the methodologies, metrics and decision processes” of proxy advisory firms as a major issue affecting 
the activity of such firms). 
290 See Daines et al., supra note 92, at 441 (arguing that commercial governance indices might 
provide better measures of governance quality than academic indices). 
291 Regulators already use “public governance ratings” for banks, namely the CAMELS ratings. 
See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., RISK MANAGEMENT MANUAL OF EXAMINATION POLICIES § 1.1, at 3 
(2015). (CAMELS stands for Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management, Earnings, Liquidity, and 
Sensitivity to market risk). 
292 See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 987, 1013–15, 1017–22 
(2010) (providing a thorough discussion of the changes that have occurred in proxy rules in the past 
twenty years). 
293 See id. at 1010–11. To be elected to the board under a majority voting system, a director is 
required to win the votes of a majority of the shares voting. In contrast, in the traditional plurality 
voting system, the director with the most votes—and thus, potentially, even a single vote—wins. Id. at 
1010. 
294 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 112 (2015) (giving shareholders the right to nominate dissident 
slates of directors); id. § 113 (allowing shareholders to adopt bylaws that reimburse “expenses incurred 
by a stockholder in soliciting proxies in connection with an election of directors”). 
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Act’s introduction of say-on-pay shareholder votes and further expansion 
of the scope of shareholder proposals.295 
Shareholder advocates have praised these reform interventions as 
consistent with the assumption that “statistics provided by academic 
research provide objective evidence that is valuable for policymaking.”296 
While we share that assumption, we challenge the contention that available 
empirical evidence supports the case for shareholder empowerment as it 
ignores the intertemporal dynamics of firm-value maximization and the 
limited commitment problem. Contrary to that contention, our 
comprehensive analysis of corporate governance has showed that there is 
value in limiting shareholder rights to interfere with board decisionmaking 
in the short term, if such limits involve a bilateral commitment of both 
shareholders and directors to corporate stability, longer-term investment 
strategies, and stronger stakeholder relationships. Unless shareholder 
advocates can expose flaws in our research and counter it with research that 
avoids these flaws, the evidence produced by this Article should be 
regarded as changing the relevant empirical facts to be considered by 
regulators and policymakers. 
In particular, this evidence challenges the introduction of amendments 
to proxy rules, as well as more recent amendments expanding the scope of 
shareholder proposals. As a result of these reforms, it has today become 
possible—and increasingly common—for shareholders to solicit (1) 
opposition to a management proposal, including merger proposals, (2) the 
withholding of votes in directors elections, and (3) support for shareholder 
precatory proposals under Rule 14a-8 of the Securities Exchange Act, 
including proposals to destagger the boards.297 All of these changes go in 
the direction of enabling increased shareholder empowerment at the 
expense of weakened board authority, which our empirical and theoretical 
analysis has showed can produce detrimental effects. In keeping with this 
analysis’s conclusion that efficient governance requires short-term 
incumbent protection from removal without jeopardizing long-term 
accountability mechanisms, we suggest that current proxy rules should be 
amended to restrict increased shareholder activism to the long term. This 
means, in practice, that the above shareholders proposals should be banned 
 
295 See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
sec. 951, § 14A(a)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 1899 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1). 
296 Bebchuk, supra note 14, at 1667.  
297 See Kahan & Rock, supra note 292, at 1014. Under Rule 14a-8, shareholders can use precatory 
proposals to request the board of directors to take a certain action without mandating the action. See 
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2015). 
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for the first three years after the inception of a new director’s tenure for two 
reasons. First, a three-year term is the standard for directors serving on a 
staggered board,298 the adoption of which our empirical results (consistent 
with the Cremers–Sepe study) show to be associated with an increase in 
firm value.299 Second, considering that the average CEO’s tenure is seven 
years,300 identifying a short-term horizon of less than three years seems 
reasonable. 
This Article’s evidence similarly exposes recent changes enabling 
majority voting in the election of directors as potentially detrimental. In 
recent years, majority voting has emerged as the most potent weapon in the 
new arsenal of shareholders’ governance levers, with activist shareholders 
increasingly threatening to engage in withholding campaigns against 
incumbents to obtain desired governance changes—including the removal 
of bilateral protection arrangements.301 This weakens the commitment value 
of such arrangements, as what makes a commitment credible is the level of 
difficulty encountered in attempting to renege on the commitment ex 
post.302 Accordingly, our analysis raises the question of whether majority 
voting should be repealed from state laws governing the election of 
directors. 
Say-on-pay shareholder votes, instead, are a potentially beneficial 
reform, as they increase the scope for constructive dialectical confrontation 
between boards and shareholders. However, the implementation of this 
instrument raises concerns under the analysis developed by this Article. 
The Dodd–Frank Act itself does not specify a default rule for the frequency 
of say-on-pay votes, delegating regulation of the matter to the SEC. 
Regulation under the SEC, on the one hand, provides that “a say-on-pay 
vote is required at least once every three calendar years.”303 On the other, 
however, it provides that, unless a majority of a company’s votes are cast in 
favor of having biennial or triennial say-on-pay votes, companies cannot 
 
298 See Koppes et al., supra note 141, at 1029 & n.21. 
299 See supra Table 2. 
300 See Steven N. Kaplan & Bernadette A. Minton, How Has CEO Turnover Changed?, 12 INT’L 
REV. FIN. 57, 58 (2012) (documenting that, from 1992 to 2007, for a sample of large U.S. companies, 
the average CEO turnover was about seven years). 
301 See Cremers & Sepe, supra note 18, at 137–38; Leo. E. Strine, Jr., Toward Common Sense and 
Common Ground? Reflections on the Shared Interests of Managers and Labor in a More Rational 
System of Corporate Governance, 33 J. CORP. L. 1, 8–9, 11–12 (2007). 
302 See Kahan & Rock, supra note 199, at 517. 
303 Shareholder Approval of Executive Compensation and Golden Parachute Compensation, 
76 Fed. Reg. 6010, 6013 (Feb. 2, 2011). 
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exclude subsequent shareholder proposals for annual votes.304 Although 
concededly less than clear, these combined provisions have been 
commonly interpreted as meaning that, unless another choice is made, 
companies must give shareholders a subsequent vote on the prospect of 
having a say-on-pay vote each year.305 This raises concerns because it 
transforms say-on-pay votes into an additional bargaining lever that 
shareholders can exploit to exercise counterproductive short-term pressure 
on boards. Accordingly, we suggest that the SEC regulation should be 
amended to establish a mandatory triennial rule for the frequency of say-
on-pay votes. 
Conversely, our analysis suggests that the use of unilateral protection 
arrangements, such as poison pills and golden parachutes, should be limited 
in time. The reason is straightforward. As repeated throughout this Article, 
it is possible that prices in the short term do not fully capture the 
implications of directorial decisions. In the long term, however, the size of 
directorial and managerial private information tends to decrease. 
Accordingly, unilateral protection arrangements may add needed short-
term protection to directors and managers pursuing long-term projects. 
However, in the long run, when those projects materialize, there is no 
economic rationale to continue to protect firm insiders from shareholder 
discipline.306 
Of course, we are aware of the practical difficulties that each of these 
outlined proposals is likely to encounter in the current political 
environment. Nonetheless, the first step toward attempting future reform 
intervention necessarily involves reeducating regulators about the 
considerations that better serve the interests of shareholders and society as 
a whole. The framework of analysis offered in this Article, and the 
conclusion it achieves, should hopefully prove useful to that end, providing 
policymakers with tangible reasons for reconsidering the current direction 
of corporate governance policies. 
 
304 Id. at 6020. 
305 While annual say-on-pay votes seem to have become, in practice, the default, the SEC’s 
wording is puzzling. On the one hand, the SEC regulation seems to specify a three-year default when it 
comes to a company’s obligation to hold say-on-pay votes; on the other, it grants shareholders a default 
right to demand say-on-pay votes annually. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-21 (2015). In other words, there 
would seem to exist an inconsistency between the default duty of corporations and the default right of 
shareholders concerning say-on-pay votes.  
306 We observe that while proxy advisory firms remain strongly opposed to bilateral protection 
arrangements, our proposal is consistent with their most recent guidelines on poison pills. Indeed, these 
firms do not oppose the adoption of a poison pill as long as the pill expires within a term of twelve 
months or less and is adopted in response to a specific threat. See, e.g., ISS GUIDELINES, supra note 
285, at 11. 
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CONCLUSION 
The case for shareholder empowerment rests on a very simple 
proposition: since maximizing shareholder wealth is the best means to 
achieve overall wealth maximization, shareholders necessarily emerge as 
the party best placed to provide governance inputs that pursue that end. As 
a corollary of this proposition, limiting shareholders’ ability to provide 
governance inputs—by removing incumbents from the “hard” judgment of 
the market—impairs the pursuit of shareholder wealth maximization. In 
support of this theoretical approach, shareholder advocates have used 
governance indices to document the value-increasing effect of shareholder 
empowerment and the correspondingly value-decreasing effect of 
incumbent protection from removal. 
Empowered by the seemingly objective evidence obtained for 
governance indices, shareholder advocates have been very successful in 
advancing the case for stronger shareholder rights in the past two decades. 
On the other hand, expert lawyers and academics supporting the case for 
the traditional board-centric model of the corporation have been painted 
into a corner—being accused by shareholder advocates of defending claims 
unsupported by “the existing theoretical understanding and the available 
empirical evidence.”307 
This Article shows, theoretically and empirically, that it is time to halt 
the shareholder empowerment crusade. It does so by examining over thirty 
years of corporate governance choices (from 1978 to 2008), demonstrating 
that such a crusade hurts, rather than benefits, U.S. shareholders by placing 
excessive reliance on market efficiency and jeopardizing the organizational 
principles that have historically contributed to the success of U.S. 
corporations. Those principles emphasize the authority of boards of 
directors over shareholders as a response to market imperfections.308 
Indeed, when the potential for asset-pricing inefficiency is fully considered, 
enhanced board authority emerges as a necessary response to the inability 
of shareholders vested with strong exit rights to credibly commit to long-
term value creation. 
The proposition—defended by those who constructed prior 
governance and commercial indices—that incumbent protection from 
removal is uniformly detrimental to shareholder interests is thus both 
 
307 Bebchuk, supra note 14, at 1644; see also id. at 1687 (arguing that the “existing theoretical 
learning and the available empirical evidence” provide support that board-centric governance measures 
“produce long-term costs that exceed their long-term benefits”).  
308 See Cremers & Sepe, supra note 18, at 142–43. 
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theoretically and empirically wanting. As shown by this Article’s 
reexamination of the E-Index over a much longer period—and further 
examination of each of the key provisions—bilateral protection 
arrangements that protect incumbents from short-term removal with the 
agreement of shareholders are not a reflection of managerial moral hazard. 
Rather, they are a means to re-empower U.S. boards with the authority to 
commit shareholders to long-term value creation. At the same time, that 
protection does not jeopardize market-based accountability mechanisms 
because it does not prevent shareholders from exercising their disciplining 
function in the long term. Hence, a republican corporate model advances 
both shareholder and societal interests. 
This conclusion calls for reform intervention directed at rolling back 
the gains made by shareholder advocates, both in the real corporate world 
and among policymakers. To that end, both commercial governance ratings 
supporting the case for stronger shareholder rights, as well as shareholder-
friendly changes that have occurred in the legal landscape, should be put 
under intense scrutiny. 
Along the same lines, future empirical research examining the 
relationship between governance and performance should abandon the 
indiscriminate approach of the past. Ironically, that same criticism provided 
the motivation for the construction of the E-Index.309 Our analysis, 
however, has shown that avoiding indiscriminate approaches not only 
requires identifying “the key provisions that matter,”310 but also correctly 
understanding why those provisions matter. 
 
309 See Bebchuk et al., supra note 12, at 787, 823. 
310 See id. at 824. 
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APPENDIX 
APPENDIX TABLE A† 
Dependent Variables:  
Q 
 
Tobin’s Q, defined as the Market value of assets 
(i.e., Total Assets – Book Equity + Market 
Equity) divided by the book value of assets. 
Calculation follows Fama and French (1992).311 
Source of data is the Compustat annual data file.  
Independent and Interacted Variables:  
Governance Indices and Their Constituent Provisions 
E-Index 
 
Sum of six governance provision indicators in the 
corporate charter or bylaws introduced by 
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009): Staggered 
Board + Poison Pill + SM Charter + SM Bylaws 
+ SM Merger + Parachutes.312  
I-Index 
 
Incumbent index, which is the sum of three 
governance provision indicators in the corporate 
charter or bylaws: Poison Pill + SM Bylaws + 
Parachutes. 
C-Index 
 
Commitment index, which is the sum of three 
governance provision indicators in the corporate 
charter or bylaws: Staggered Board + SM 
Charter + SM Merger. 
Staggered Board 
 
Indicator variable equal to one (zero otherwise) if 
the board is staggered. Data is obtained from 
Cremers et al. (2016).313  
Poison Pill 
 
Indicator variables equal to one (zero otherwise) 
if the firm has a poison pill in place, under which 
shareholders are typically issued rights to 
purchase stock in the company (or in the 
acquiring company) at a steep discount if a hostile 
 
311 Fama & French, supra note 157. 
312 Bebchuk et al., supra note 12.  
313 Cremers et al., supra note 117.  
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bidder acquires a certain percentage of 
outstanding shares, where the rights of the hostile 
bidder are void. 
SM Charter 
 
Indicator variables equal to one (zero otherwise) 
if the firm has adopted a charter amendment that 
restricts shareholders from amending the 
corporate charter. A typical restriction requires a 
supermajority shareholder vote. 
SM Bylaws  
 
Indicator variables equal to one (zero otherwise) 
if the firm has adopted limits or prohibitions on 
the rights of shareholders to amend the corporate 
bylaws. A typical restriction requires a 
supermajority vote. 
SM Merger 
 
Indicator variables equal to one (zero otherwise) 
if the firm has established shareholder vote 
requirements that are higher than the minimum 
levels set by the relevant state laws to approve a 
merger or other business combination, which 
typically require a simple majority for approval. 
A typical higher requirement is 67%, 75%, or 
80% of votes, but includes firms incorporated in a 
state with a control share acquisition statute that 
did not opt out of those. 
Parachutes 
 
Indicator variables equal to one (zero otherwise) 
if the firm has a golden parachute in place, which 
is a severance agreement providing cash, noncash 
benefits, or both, to senior executives if specific 
events occur after a change in control of the 
company. Events triggering payments include 
termination, demotion, or resignation of these 
executives within some specified period after the 
change of corporate control. 
Standard Controls   
Assets Natural logarithm of the book value of total assets. 
Delaware Incorporation Indicator variable if the company is incorporated in Delaware.  
ROA  EBITDA / Total Assets. 
CAPX  Capital Expenditures / Total Assets. 
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R&D R&D Expenditures / Sales. 
Interacted Variables   
Large Customer 
 
Indicator variable set equal to one if the firm has 
at least one customer accounting for 10% or more 
of its sales, from Compustat Segment data. 
Labor Productivity  
 
Industry-level measure of the marginal product of 
labor, from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(using the four digit SIC code). 
Industry M&A Volume 
The ratio of mergers and acquisitions’ dollar 
volume in SDC to the total market capitalization 
from CRSP for a calendar year, as per a given 
Fama–French 49 industry. The CRSP annual 
industry market capitalization is for ordinary 
stocks only and excludes ADRs and REITs. If no 
M&A activity per given industry-year is reported 
in SDC, we assume it to be zero. We include 
transactions where buyer achieves control of the 
target.  
Z-Score 
 
Proxy for the risk of bankruptcy as proposed by 
Altman (1968).314 The Z-Score is calculated as 
follows: Z = 1.2 x T1 + 1.4 x T2 + 3.3 x T3 + 0.6 
x T4 + 0.99 x T5. Here, T1 = Working Capital / 
Total Assets, a measure of the liquid assets in 
relation to the size of the company; T2 = Retained 
Earnings / Total Assets, a measure of profitability 
that reflects the company’s historical earning 
power; T3 = Earnings Before Interest and Taxes / 
Total Assets, a measure of current operating 
efficiency apart from tax and leveraging factors; 
T4 = Market Value of Equity / Book Value of 
Total Liabilities, a proxy of the market’s 
perception of the efficient use of the firm’s assets; 
T5 = Sales / Total Assets, a measure of total asset 
turnover. 
† Appendix Table A presents brief definitions of the main variables that appear in the analysis. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at one percent in both tails. 
 
  
 
314 Altman, supra note 242. 
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APPENDIX TABLE B: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR MAIN VARIABLES† 
 
Dependent Variables:  Mean Median St. Dev. Min. Max. Obs. 
Q  1.69 1.39 0.92 0.72 4.66 21,414 
Z-Score  4.13 3.55 2.44 0.87 10.31 18,894 
Independent 
Variables:        
E-Index  2.18 2.00 1.37 0 6 21,414 
I-Index  0.57 1.00 0.49 0 1 21,414 
C-Index  0.50 0.00 0.50 0 1 21,414 
Staggered Board 0.03 0.00 0.16 0 1 21,414 
Poison Pill  0.17 0.00 0.38 0 1 21,414 
SM Charter  0.34 0.00 0.48 0 1 21,414 
SM Bylaws   0.56 1.00 0.50 0 1 21,414 
SM Merger  0.94 1.00 0.78 0 3 21,414 
Parachutes  1.24 1.00 0.93 0 3 21,414 
Assets 7.24 7.08 1.52 4.55 11.05 21,414 
Delaware 
Incorporation  0.59 1.00 0.49 0 1 21,414 
ROA 0.14 0.14 0.08 -0.05 0.32 21,414 
CAPX  0.059 0.047 0.046 0 0.20 21,414 
R&D 0.033 0.002 0.060 0 0.23 21,414 
Large Customer  0.032 0.013 0.075 0 1.17 21,414 
Labor Productivity   1.36 1.04 0.70 0.29 3.67 18,414 
Industry M&A Volume  0.28 0.00 0.45 0 1 21,414 
† Appendix Table B presents sample descriptive statistics for the main dependent and independent variables, as 
well as the interacted variables, for the main sample for which all provisions of the E-Index are available. 
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APPENDIX TABLE C: C-INDEX AND I-INDEX PROVISIONS: TIME-SERIES ANALYSIS† 
Dependent Variable: Q 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Independent Variables      
Staggered Board 0.102** 0.104** 0.107**    
 (2.45) (2.30) (2.32)    
SM Charter 0.156*  0.141    
 (1.84)  (1.54)    
SM Charter x -0.108  -0.0957    
  Staggered Board (-1.24)  (-1.02)    
SM Merger  0.0423 0.0217    
  (0.98) (0.48)    
SM Merger x  -0.0365 -0.0205    
  Staggered Board  (-0.71) (-0.38)    
Poison Pill    -0.0186 -0.0617* -0.0583 
    (-0.69) (-1.90) (-1.64) 
SM Bylaw    0.00552  0.00722 
    (0.13)  (0.17) 
SM Bylaw x    -0.0842*  -0.0858** 
   Poison Pill    (-1.93)  (-1.98) 
Parachutes     -0.0731*** -0.0924*** 
     (-2.97) (-3.36) 
Parachutes x     0.0586* 0.0755** 
Poison Pill     (1.74) (2.13) 
Fixed Effects:                                                     Year + Firm 
               N 21,455 21,840 21,438 21,555 24,348 21,555 
               R-sq 0.743 0.744 0.743 0.743 0.740 0.743 
† In this Table, we present the time-series association between firm value and the level of the three constituent 
governance provisions in the C-Index in Columns (1)–(3)—namely Staggered Board, SM Charter, and SM 
Merger—and the three constituent governance provisions in the I-Index in Columns (4)–(6)—namely Poison 
Pill, SM Bylaw, and Parachutes—using pooled panel regressions of Q on the governance index or its 
provision(s) with year and firm fixed effects plus a set of standard controls: Assets, ROA, CAPX, R&D, and 
Industry M&A Volume. In Columns (1) and (3), we also include the interaction between Staggered Board and 
SM Charter, in Columns (2) and (3) the interaction between Staggered Board and SM Merger, in Columns (4) 
and (6) the interaction between Poison Pill and SM Bylaw, and, finally, in Columns (5) and (6) the interaction 
between Poison Pill and Parachutes. All columns use the full time period 1978–2008. Coefficients on standard 
controls are not shown to save space. Variables are defined in Appendix Table A. Statistical significance of the 
coefficients is indicated at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels by ***, **, and *, respectively. We provide the t-statistics 
below each regression coefficient based on robust standard errors that are clustered by firm. 
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APPENDIX TABLE D: BANKRUPTCY RISK AND GOVERNANCE INDICES† 
 
Dependent Variable: Z-Score 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Independent Variables    
E-Index -0.0935*** 
(-2.71) 
C-Index 0.115* 0.161*** 
(1.91) (2.65) 
I-Index -0.197*** -0.217*** 
(-4.46) (-4.81) 
Fixed Effects:                                                                     Year + Firm 
              N 19,827 19,851 19,962 19,827 
              R-sq 0.731 0.730 0.732 0.732 
† In this Table, we present the time-series association between Z-Score, a proxy of bankruptcy risk, and three 
governance indices (the E-Index, C-Index, and I-Index) using pooled panel regressions of Z-Score with year and 
firm fixed effects plus a set of controls: Assets, CAPX, R&D, and Industry M&A Volume. All columns use the 
full time period 1978–2008. Coefficients on standard controls are not shown to save space. Variables are defined 
in Appendix Table A. Statistical significance of the coefficients is indicated at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels by 
***, **, and *, respectively, based on robust standard errors that are clustered by firm. We provide the t-statistics 
below each regression coefficient based on robust standard errors that are clustered by firm. 
 
